Decomposition Based MOEA with Unique Subregions and Stable Matching

Author(s):  
Zhixue Wang ◽  
Hanning Chen ◽  
Xiaodan Liang ◽  
Maowei He
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Young Hwan Chang ◽  
Jeremy Linsley ◽  
Josh Lamstein ◽  
Jaslin Kalra ◽  
Irina Epstein ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Matías Fuentes ◽  
Fernando Tohmé

Abstract In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two-sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, stable matchings not only exist but are also Pareto optimal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (11) ◽  
pp. 3154-3169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thành Nguyen ◽  
Rakesh Vohra

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a “nearby” instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two. (JEL C78, D47, I11, J41, J44)


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