Transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1008-1015 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.M. Zolezzi ◽  
H. Rudnick
Author(s):  
Felipe C. Lucchese ◽  
Luciana N. Canha ◽  
Wagner S. Brignol ◽  
Marcelo Benetti ◽  
Mauricio Sperandio ◽  
...  

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Silárszky ◽  
René Levínský

In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the implications of coalition formation and the entry of some Central and Eastern European countries on the voting power of the member states. The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyze the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.


Top ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-24
Author(s):  
Fioravante Patrone

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