scholarly journals An ideal free distribution explains the root production of plants that do not engage in a tragedy of the commons game

2014 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon G. McNickle ◽  
Joel S. Brown
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon McNickle ◽  
Joel S Brown

1. Game theoretic models that seek to predict the most competitive strategy plants use for competition in soil are clear; they generally predict that over-proliferation of roots is the only evolutionarily stable strategy. However, empirical studies are equally clear that not all plants employ this strategy of over-proliferation of roots. Here, our goal was to develop and test an alternative non-game theoretic model that can be used to develop alternative hypotheses for plants that do not appear to play games. 2. The model is similar to previous models, but does not use a game theoretic optimization criterion. Instead, plants use only nutrient availability to select a root allocation strategy, ignoring neighbours. To test the model we compare root allocation and seed yield of plants grown either alone or with neighbours. 3. The model predicted plants that do not sense neighbours (or ignore neighbours) should allocate roots relative to resource availability following an ideal free distribution. This means that if a soil volume of quality R contains x roots, then a soil volume of quality R/n will contain x/n roots. The experimental data were consistent with this prediction. That is, plants grown with 1.2g of slow release fertilizer resources produced 0.043 g of roots, while plants grown with neighbours, or plants grown with half as much fertilizer produced half as much root mass (0.026g, and 0.24g respectively). Seed yield followed a similar pattern. 4. This model presents an alternative predictive framework for those plant species that do not seem to play a tragedy of the commons game for belowground competition. 5. Synthesis: It remains unclear why some plants do not engage in belowground games for competition. Models suggest over-proliferation is an unbeatable evolutionary stable strategy, yet plants that do not play the game apparently coexist with plants that do. We suggest that a greater understanding of trade-offs among traits that are important for other biotic interactions (above-ground competition, enemy defence, mutualisms) will lead to a greater understanding of why some species over-proliferate roots when in competition but other species do not.


ISRN Zoology ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig M. Thompson ◽  
Eric M. Gese

Swift foxes (Vulpes velox) are an endemic mesocarnivore of North America subject to resource and predation-based pressures. While swift fox demographics have been documented, there is little information on the importance of top-down versus bottom-up pressures or the effect of landscape heterogeneity. Using a consumable resource-based ideal free distribution model as a conceptual framework, we isolated the effects of resource-based habitat selection on fox population ecology. We hypothesized if swift fox ecology is predominantly resource dependant, distribution, survival, and space use would match predictions made under ideal free distribution theory. We monitored survival and home range use of 47 swift foxes in southeastern Colorado from 2001 to 2004. Annual home range size was 15.4 km2, and seasonal home range size was 10.1 km2. At the individual level, annual home range size was unrelated to survival. Estimates of fox density ranged from 0.03 to 0.18 foxes/km2. Seasonal survival rates were 0.73 and 1.0 and did not differ seasonally. Foxes conformed to the predictions of the ideal free distribution model during winter, indicating foxes are food stressed and their behavior governed by resource acquisition. During the rest of the year, behavior was not resource driven and was governed by security from intraguild predation.


2004 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dheeraj K. Veeranagoudar ◽  
Bhagyashri A. Shanbhag ◽  
Srinivas K. Saidapur

10.2307/4456 ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 821 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Sutherland

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