Corporate Governance Dynamics of Political Tie Formation in Emerging Economies: Business Group Affiliation, Family Ownership, and Institutional Transition

Author(s):  
Chi‐Nien Chung ◽  
Hongjin Zhu
2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Neeti Khetarpal Sanan ◽  
Dinesh Jaisinghani ◽  
Sangeeta Yadav

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether, in emerging economies, the relationship between a firm’s corporate governance (CG) and its performance is associated with firm’s affiliation to a business group. Design/methodology/approach A total of 209 publicly listed firms in India during a 10-year period from 2007 to 2016 were studied, and the random effects model was employed for analysis. Findings Empirical evidence showed that board size and institutional shareholding positively impacted firm performance, whereas the proportion of independent directors negatively impacted performance. In group-affiliated firms in emerging economies, chief executive officer duality negatively impacted, whereas institutional shareholding positively impacted performance. These results are consistent with the principal–principal agency theory. The study found no discernible impact of proportion of independent directors on firm performance in group-affiliated firms. Originality/value In analyzing the governance–performance relationship and its association with business groups, this study extends current understanding by connecting business group research in emerging economies with CG and firm performance research. In examining firms from several industries over a long period of time after controlling for firm size, capital structure and spends on research and development and marketing, the results of this study offer rich empirical evidence that contributes to the extant literature on the nature of the governance–performance relationship.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 2685-2720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphne W. Yiu ◽  
William P. Wan ◽  
Yuehua Xu

How corporate governance mechanisms function in transition economies is a key topic for corporate governance researchers and policy makers. We propose that alternative governance mechanisms are in place to mitigate corporate fraudulent behaviors in the fluid state of transition economies where the establishment and enforcement of corporate governance legislation are presently insufficient. Drawing on the twin set of institutional logics—the institutional embeddedness logic and the institutional substitution logic—we posit that three salient types of prevailing alternative governance mechanisms (relational, administrative, and foreign governance) play important roles in transition economies because they are complementary to the institutional conditions at the time of the transition process. Conducting a bivariate probit analysis of a matched sample of corporate financial fraud cases in China, we find that strategic alliances, business group affiliation, nontradable state shares, local government ownership, use of foreign auditors, and foreign listing can deter corporate financial fraud, while foreign listing is also effective in detecting fraud. We also find that the deterrence effects of strategic alliances and business group affiliation become weaker as law development improves, while foreign listing and legal governance are completely substitutive. Our study provides a contextualized view of corporate governance that connects its effectiveness with institutionalization and the institutional state of a country. Our study also enriches our understanding of some unfamiliar forms of governance mechanisms that are in place and complementary to a country’s institutional conditions.


2020 ◽  

This study is an endeavor to answer the question that does corporate governance, ownership pattern and business group affiliation effect value relevance of reported earnings quality in a sample of 300 listed Pakistani firms for the period of 2006-2018. The study uses earnings response coefficient and earning predictability as proxy of reported earnings quality. The panel data analysis shows that CEOduality and director ownership have significant inverse effect on the quality of reported earnings i.e. the two do not contribute towards improvement of quality of reported earnings. Whereas board independence, independence of audit committee and external audit from big4, institutional ownerships have significant direct effect on the quality of reported earnings. Moreover, it is observed that these effects are relatively more prominent in the case of group firms. Furthermore, firm size, earning persistence, growth and leverage have positive association with the quality of reported earnings while beta has significant negative effect on the quality of earnings. Further, it is found that in times of financial crisis, firms improve its reporting quality to uphold confidence of the investors where group firms showed relatively more tending to pursue this practice. This study has several implications for shareholders, prospect investors, external auditors and regulators. This is the first study of its nature that has investigated the role of group affiliation with reported earning quality. Key words: Earnings quality, corporate governance, ownership structure, business group affiliation, ERC.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 3036-3074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Borja Larrain ◽  
Giorgo Sertsios ◽  
Francisco Urzúa I

Abstract We propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group affiliation. We study two-firm business groups, some of which split up during the sample period, leaving some firms as stand-alone firms. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry of the other group firm. We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and investment. Consistent with collateral cross-pledging, the effects are more pronounced when the other firm had high tangibility. Consistent with capital misallocation in groups, the reduction in leverage is stronger in firms that had low (high) profitability (leverage) relative to industry peers. Received July 3, 2017; editorial decision April 7, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document