Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox

Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational requirements to know one's beliefs, and finds that none succeed.

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Integrating Unconscious Belief

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198789703.013.19 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 304-330

Author(s):

Adam Leite

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

The Self ◽

First Person ◽

Moore’S Paradox ◽

Moore's Paradox ◽

Self Knowledge

The very idea of psychic integration presents puzzles in the case of unconscious belief, both for the analysand and for the theorist. In many cases, the unconsciously believed proposition is one that the analysand knows perfectly well to be false. What could it be to bring such a belief to consciousness? What could psychic integration come to in this sort of case? Put bluntly, the task facing the analysand is to consciously hold the belief even while placing it within a broader perspective in which it is recognized to be false. Implications are drawn concerning a number of large issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind: Moore’s Paradox, the role of rationality in psychic unity and self-consciousness, the nature of the first-person standpoint in relation to one’s own attitudes, transparency accounts of self-knowledge, and the role of endorsement in the constitution of the self.

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Moore'S paradox: one or two?

Analysis ◽

10.1093/analys/39.3.141 ◽

1979 ◽

Vol 39 (3) ◽

pp. 141-142 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

J. N. Williams

Keyword(s):

Moore’S Paradox ◽

Moore's Paradox

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Scientific Realism versus Antirealism in Science Education

Santalka filosofija komunikacija ◽

10.3846/cpc.2016.241 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 24 (1) ◽

pp. 72-81 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Seungbae Park

Keyword(s):

Science Education ◽

Science Teachers ◽

Scientific Realism ◽

Scientific Theory ◽

Moore’S Paradox ◽

Scientific Theories ◽

Science Classrooms ◽

Moore's Paradox ◽

Scientific Antirealism

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists.

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