scholarly journals Collective Agents and Communicative Theories of Punishment

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 436-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bill Wringe



2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Bennett

AbstractIn this paper I am concerned with a problem for communicative theories of punishment. On such theories, punishment is justified at least in part as the authoritative censure or condemnation of crime. But is this compatible with a broadly liberal political outlook? For while liberalism is generally thought to take only a very limited interest in its citizens’ attitudes (seeing moral opinion as a matter of legitimate debate), the idea of state denunciation of crime seems precisely to be focused on the attitudes expressed in action. In this paper I analyse the elements of the communicative theory of punishment, assessing the extent to which they can be considered anti-liberal. I argue that, understood in a certain way, the communicative theory, though in some sense communitarian, is compatible with at least one central and attractive non-perfectionist strand in liberalism.





Author(s):  
Richard Dagger

Chapter 5 is the first of the three chapters of Playing Fair that make the case for fair play as the basis for a compelling justification of legal punishment. As it was with the discussion of political obligation, so it is necessary to begin this part of the book by clarifying key terms and confronting fundamental challenges to the enterprise of justifying punishment itself. The chapter thus begins with the questions of what is punishment and what are its proper aims. The latter question is usually answered by reference to retributivism and/or deterrence, and I try to place fair-play theory in this context by linking it to communicative theories of punishment while distinguishing it from Jean Hampton’s expressive version of retributivism. The chapter concludes with responses to those who would, for various reasons, abolish punishment altogether.



Author(s):  
Costanza Porro

AbstractIn her recent book The Limits of Blame, Erin Kelly argues that we should rethink the nature of punishment because delivering blame is, contrary to the widely held view, not among the justifiable aims of a criminal justice system. In this paper, firstly, I discuss her case against criminal blame. Kelly argues that the emphasis on blame in the criminal justice system and in public discourse is one of the main causes of the stigma and exclusion faced by those convicted for a crime. This claim might appear puzzling and, while she provides other convincing arguments against criminal blame, Kelly does not extensively defend this particular argument. To offer support for this view, I reflect on the often overlooked distinction between moral blame and criminal blame to show how the latter, unlike the former, is exclusionary and stigmatising. Secondly, I address the claim put forth by Kelly that blame should play no role in the criminal justice system at all. In light of her argument about the optional nature of moral blame, I explore the possibility that the state should leave open to victims the option to blame criminal wrongdoers in restorative justice conferences. I argue that in such contexts blame would not have the same exclusionary features of criminal blame in traditional settings and that it could serve some valuable aims articulated by communicative theories of punishment, such as the restoration of moral relationships.







The necessity for global ethics to guide international and intercultural research is by no means new phenomenon. In 1996, James Bretzke wrote about a then-growing appeal for global ethics, which led to a habitude of scholarly employment of hermeneutical and communicative theories that were thought to represent workable models for Christian ethics. The notion of morality has been subjected to descriptive references by socio-anthropologists when they report on the moral comportment of the societies they study. A descriptive explanation should suffice as a micro definition for the purpose of associating the notions of ethics and morality with the conduct of individuals on the basis of membership affiliation. A normative definition that is applicable to all humans would depict a macro or universal account. Gert and Gert specified that a condition of rationality is almost always a requirement for moral agency.



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