The doctrine of double effect

Author(s):  
Jen Browne ◽  
Mariana Dittborn ◽  
Joe Brierley
2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-138
Author(s):  
M Davie ◽  
A Kaiser

The management of an infant after a decision to withdraw active treatment creates dilemmas. Both lingering death and active killing are undesirable, but palliative interventions can hasten death. We investigated what staff on our neonatal unit thought were the limits of acceptable practice and why. We administered a structured interview to elucidate their views, and asked them to justify their answers. The interviews were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. A total of 25 participants (15 nurses and 10 doctors) were recruited. 80% emphasized the importance of pain relief following withdrawal, 60% mentioned meeting parental needs at that time. 76% agreed that death can be a desired consequence of withdrawal, yet 52% felt that death should never be hastened. 96% felt that morphine is acceptable after withdrawal, and 72% would give a higher than normal dose if necessary. 56% would stop paralysis at extubation but not reverse it, while 24% would continue paralysis. 16% would consider a drug that ended life instantly in some cases. A wide variety of views emerged, but there were two main positions, a cautious majority, and a more proactive minority. Apparent contradictions within the majority position could be explained using the doctrine of double effect and the acts and omissions distinction.


2020 ◽  
pp. 132-148
Author(s):  
Joel E. Mann

Three tetralogies attributed to Antiphon survive, and while all three depict trials for homicide, the second and third are often treated en bloc. Antiphon’s third tetralogy describes a case in which the defendant is accused of intentional homicide. Though commentators typically read the tetralogy as a discussion of causation as such, “Responsibility Rationalized: Action and Pollution in Antiphon’s Tetralogies” reconstructs it as an early attempt to deal with issues of intention and action surrounding around what twentieth-century philosophy came to call the doctrine of double effect. While Antiphon does not articulate the doctrine, he develops a nuanced view that addresses the same concerns about responsibility for consequences that motivate its defenders.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Allsopp ◽  

Philosophy ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Whitley R. P. Kaufman

In a recent edition of the journal Philosophy, Sophie Botros asserts that modern ethical theorists have badly misunderstood the role of the Doctrine of Double Effect, turning it into a device by which to prohibit actions which are deemed impermissible; whereas the true function of the Doctrine is rather one of justifying actions. In my reply, I argue that Dr Botros has misunderstood the Doctrine: that its ‘prohibitive’ and its ‘justificatory’ roles are merely two sides of the same coin, since its function is to decide for a given action whether it is permissible or impermissible. Furthermore, Dr Botros has misconstrued the essential contribution of the DDE is not the balancing of good results against bad ones, but the quite different position that the crucial moral distinction is between intended and merely foreseen results.


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