Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence

We consider the repeated zero-sum bidding game with incomplete information on one side with non-normalized total payoff. De Meyer and Marino [(2005) Continuous versus discrete market game, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1535] and Domansky and Kreps [(2005) Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets, Proc. Appl. Ind. Math. 12(4), 950–952 (in Russian)] investigated a game [Formula: see text] modeling multistage bidding with asymmetrically informed agents and proved that for this game [Formula: see text] converges to a finite limit [Formula: see text], i.e., the error term is [Formula: see text]. In this paper, we show that for this example [Formula: see text] converges to the limit exponentially fast. For this purpose we apply the optimal strategy [Formula: see text] of insider in the infinite-stage game obtained by Domansky [(2007) Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets, Int. J. Game Theor. 36(2), 241–257] to the [Formula: see text]-stage game and deduce that it is [Formula: see text]-optimal with [Formula: see text] exponentially small.