scholarly journals Fair Leader Election for Rational Agents in Asynchronous Rings and Networks

Author(s):  
Assaf Yifrach ◽  
Yishay Mansour
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This chapter discusses the domain of pure instrumental morality that represents the second level of the two-level contractarian theory. To this end, the chapter clarifies the features of the homo prudens model that underlies the derivation of the weak principle of universalization. Further, the chapter develops, in the form of the empathetic contractor theory, the hypothetical decision situation in which rational agents are placed to derive the weak principle of universalization. Finally, the chapter clarifies the features of the weak principle of universalization that, although its derivation does not rely on substantial moral premises as traditionally conceived, weakly expresses the moral ideals of autonomy, equality, impartiality, and reciprocity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Jane R. Bambauer ◽  
Saura Masconale ◽  
Simone M. Sepe

AbstractA person’s epistemic goals sometimes clash with pragmatic ones. At times, rational agents will degrade the quality of their epistemic process in order to satisfy a goal that is knowledge-independent (for example, to gain status or at least keep the peace with friends.) This is particularly so when the epistemic quest concerns an abstract political or economic theory, where evidence is likely to be softer and open to interpretation. Before wide-scale adoption of the Internet, people sought out or stumbled upon evidence related to a proposition in a more random way. And it was difficult to aggregate the evidence of friends and other similar people to the exclusion of others, even if one had wanted to. Today, by contrast, the searchable Internet allows people to simultaneously pursue social and epistemic goals.This essay shows that the selection effect caused by a merging of social and epistemic activities will cause both polarization in beliefs and devaluation of expert testimony. This will occur even if agents are rational Bayesians and have moderate credences before talking to their peers. What appears to be rampant dogmatism could be just as well explained by the nonrandom walk in evidence-gathering. This explanation better matches the empirical evidence on how people behave on social media platforms. It also helps clarify why media outlets (not just the Internet platforms) might have their own pragmatic reasons to compromise their epistemic goals in today’s competitive and polarized information market. Yet, it also makes policy intervention much more difficult, since we are unlikely to neatly separate individuals’ epistemic goals from their social ones.


Author(s):  
Janna Burman ◽  
Ho-Lin Chen ◽  
Hsueh-Ping Chen ◽  
David Doty ◽  
Thomas Nowak ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Leszek Gąsieniec ◽  
Grzegorz Stachowiak

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Alicja Kowalewska

Abstract Some theories of rational belief assume that beliefs should be closed under conjunction. I motivate the rejection of the conjunction closure, and point out that the consequences of this rejection are not as severe as it is usually thought. An often raised objection is that without the conjunction closure people are unable to reason. I outline an approach in which we can – in usual cases – reason using conjunctions without accepting the closure in its whole generality. This solution is based on the notion of confidence levels, which can be defined using probabilities. Moreover, on this approach, reasoning has a scalable computational complexity adaptable to cognitive abilities of both rationally bounded and perfectly rational agents. I perform a simulation to assess its error rate, and compare it to reasoning with conjunction closure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104698
Author(s):  
Othon Michail ◽  
Paul G. Spirakis ◽  
Michail Theofilatos

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