Where Ethical and Epistemic Demands Meet

Chapter 5 explores the idea that we face a dilemma with respect to stereotyping: that when stereotypes reflect social reality, people can either do what is best from an epistemic perspective, and allow the stereotypes to influence their judgements, or they can do what is best from an ethical perspective and avoid stereotyping. This chapter shows that although ethical and epistemic demands sometimes conflict in this way, sometimes they can both be met through stereotyping, and at other times they can both be met by not stereotyping. Rather than facing a relatively straightforward dilemma, we face a serious practical difficulty of discerning, in any specific context, whether the application of a stereotype will facilitate the achievement of either or both ethical and epistemic goals. The argument in this chapter is primarily focused on the case study of stereotyping in medicine but applies broadly to stereotyping across various social domains.

Religious Disagreement, Mystical Experience, and Doxastic Minimalism: Critical Notice of John Pittard’s Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

In his recent book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, John Pittard challenges J.L. Schellenberg’s rejection of mystical experience as worthy of enjoying presumptive doxastic trust for two main reasons. First, Pittard holds that Schellenberg wrongly focuses only on avoiding error while placing no emphasis on gaining truth. I argue that, contra Pittard, Schellenberg’s account nicely balances the competing epistemic goals of gaining truth and avoiding error. Second, Pittard thinks that Schellenberg’s criteria for presumptive trust in that of universality and unavoidability are arbitrary. I counter that Schellenberg’s criteria are not arbitrary since they are the best way of achieving these goals. I conclude that despite not enjoying presumptive doxastic trust, this in itself does not entail that mystical experiences are never trustworthy.

A Model Proposal to Address Relationships Between Epistemic Practices and Socioscientific Issues in Science Education

In this paper, we present a model that relates epistemic practices and socio-scientific issues (SSI) in science education. In order to develop it, we establish interweavings between norms, practices, epistemic objectives, epistemic cognition, informal reasoning, epistemic practices and justified positioning. We suggest that epistemic cognition is the link between reasoning and epistemic practices. We present three epistemic goals that should guide work with epistemic practices when solving a SSI: recognising and using multiple lines of reasoning when solving the SSI, construction and evaluation of holistic arguments aiming to understand the multiple dimensions of the SSI and the development of sceptical investigations to resolve the SSI. The stated objectives contribute to the critical assessment and resolution of the SSI. We believe that for the construction of social norms in teaching environments with SSI, it should be considered that these questions do not require a “single” answer and, therefore, a space for reflection, awareness and justification of the different perspectives on the question must be allowed. The relationships established in this article contribute to research that aims to develop and analyse epistemic practices “in situ” in teaching contexts with SSI. In addition, they have the potential to provide support to teachers who wish to favour the occurrence of epistemic practices in a SSI approach.

Verification and Strategy Synthesis for Coalition Announcement Logic

Coalition announcement logic (CAL) is one of the family of the logics of quantified announcements. It allows us to reason about what a coalition of agents can achieve by making announcements in the setting where the anti-coalition may have an announcement of their own to preclude the former from reaching its epistemic goals. In this paper, we describe a PSPACE-complete model checking algorithm for CAL that produces winning strategies for coalitions. The algorithm is implemented in a proof-of-concept model checker.

Non-Tethered Understanding and Scientific Pluralism

I examine situations in which we say that different subjects have ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon. In order to make sense of such situations, we should turn our attention to an often neglected ambiguity in the word ‘understanding’. Whereas the notion of understanding that is typically discussed in philosophy is, to use Elgin’s terms, tethered to the facts, there is another notion of understanding that is not tethered in the same way. This latter notion is relevant because, typically, talk of two subjects having ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon does not entail any commitment to the proposition that these subjects understand the phenomenon in the tethered sense of the word. This paper aims, first, to analyze the non-tethered notion of understanding, second, to clarify its relationship to the tethered notion, third, to explore what exactly goes on when ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ clash and, fourth, to discuss the significance of such situations in our epistemic practices. In particular, I argue for a version of scientific pluralism according to which such situations are important because they help scientific communities achieve their fundamental epistemic goals—most importantly, the goal of understanding the world in the tethered sense.

THE NONRANDOM WALK OF KNOWLEDGE

A person’s epistemic goals sometimes clash with pragmatic ones. At times, rational agents will degrade the quality of their epistemic process in order to satisfy a goal that is knowledge-independent (for example, to gain status or at least keep the peace with friends.) This is particularly so when the epistemic quest concerns an abstract political or economic theory, where evidence is likely to be softer and open to interpretation. Before wide-scale adoption of the Internet, people sought out or stumbled upon evidence related to a proposition in a more random way. And it was difficult to aggregate the evidence of friends and other similar people to the exclusion of others, even if one had wanted to. Today, by contrast, the searchable Internet allows people to simultaneously pursue social and epistemic goals.This essay shows that the selection effect caused by a merging of social and epistemic activities will cause both polarization in beliefs and devaluation of expert testimony. This will occur even if agents are rational Bayesians and have moderate credences before talking to their peers. What appears to be rampant dogmatism could be just as well explained by the nonrandom walk in evidence-gathering. This explanation better matches the empirical evidence on how people behave on social media platforms. It also helps clarify why media outlets (not just the Internet platforms) might have their own pragmatic reasons to compromise their epistemic goals in today’s competitive and polarized information market. Yet, it also makes policy intervention much more difficult, since we are unlikely to neatly separate individuals’ epistemic goals from their social ones.

Do You Want to Learn Physics? Please PlayAngry Birds(But With Epistemic Goals)

For some years now, the scientific community has been studying how videogames foster acquisition of mental representations of the world around us. Research to date suggests that the efficiency of videogames as learning tools largely depends on the instructional design in which they are included. This article provides empirical evidence related to the use of the videogame Angry Birds and how it can modify students’ conceptions regarding object motion. We selected a sample of 110 16- to 17-year-old students in postcompulsory secondary school. Both quantitative and qualitative data are provided. Our results show that (a) merely playing Angry Birds does not produce significant learning, (b) learning occurs when Angry Birds is guided by epistemic goals. Students who used the videogame in this way were able to recognize more variables, provide better explanations, and understand more fully the relationship between angle and distance, (c) naïf belief regarding the effect of mass on falling objects (“mass-speed belief”) remained unchanged after using Angry Birds guided either pragmatic or epistemic goals, and (d) there was no significant difference between students who worked collaboratively in pairs and those who worked individually. In the light of these results, we discuss potential implications for the future.

Compressing, Expanding, and Attending to Scientific Meaning: Writing the Semiotic Hybrid of Science for Professional and Citizen Scientists

Drawing on a text-based ethnography of digital writing in a biology laboratory, this article examines the text trajectory of a scientific manuscript and a scientific team’s related writing for public audiences, including for citizen scientists. Using data drawn from texts, observations, interviews, and related artifacts, the author examines how scientists conceptualize and adapt their multimodal writing for specialized scientific audiences as well as lay audiences interested in the work of scientific inquiry. Three concepts— meaning compression, meaning expansion, and meaning attention—were used to analyze the multimodal strategies that scientists employ when composing for different audiences. Findings suggest that while scientists often restrict their writing practices to meaning compression to maintain the values and conventions of scientific genres, they also sometimes deploy a wider range of multimodal strategies when writing for nonspecialist audiences. These findings underscore the complex rhetorical environments scientists navigate and the need to support emerging scientific writers’ development as versatile writers able to adapt varied multimodal strategies to diverse rhetorical and epistemic goals.