A Ghost in the Ivory Tower: Positivism and International Legal Regulation of Armed Opposition Groups

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

Why do scholars, who generally acknowledge the international legal personality of non-State entities, still question the bindingness of the law of non-international armed conflict on insurgents? This article examines the relationship between the two dominant positivist conceptions of international legal personality and the rights and obligations of insurgents as a matter of positive international law. First, the article illustrates that the evolution of the law of non-international armed conflict corroborates Hans Kelsen’s idea that the international legal personality of an entity, be it a State, an armed opposition group, or an individual, is solely contingent upon interpretation of international norms. Second, it shows that the traditional perception of States as exclusive subjects of international law – though never reflected in positive norms governing non-international armed conflict – continues to influence the current debate on the theoretical underpinnings for binding insurgents. The orthodox ‘States-only’ conception of international legal personality is seemingly so ingrained in the minds of contemporary international lawyers that they inadvertently rely on it when faced with international legal regulation of non-State entities. Finally, the article addresses the implications of these findings for the overall question of international legal obligations of non-State actors.

Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

This book scrutinizes the relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of the individual as a matter of positive international law. By testing four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical and existing international legal norms that govern individuals, the book argues that the common narrative about the development of the role of the individual in international law is flawed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to States alone until the Second World War, only to transform during the second half of the twentieth century to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is—and always was—solely contingent upon the interpretation of international legal norms. It follows, of course, that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international and national legal norms turns exclusively on the nature of their respective sources. Against the background of these insights, the book shows how present-day international lawyers continue to allow an idea, which was never more than a scholarly invention of the nineteenth century, to influence the interpretation and application of contemporary international law. This state of affairs has significant real-world ramifications as international legal rights and obligations of individuals (and other non-State entities) are frequently applied more restrictively than interpretation without presumptions regarding ‘personality’ would merit.


Author(s):  
Boris Krivokapić

The paper deals with international legal status of multinational (transnational) companies. The first part gives an overview of this entities and the specifics of their role in the modern world.In the second part, the author deals with the elements of international legal personality of multinational (transnational) companies. Such as international legal regulation of the position of these entities, their specific rights and obligations under international law, international responsibility, process subjectivity before certain international judicial bodies and the special relationship (partnership) with international organizations. It should be added that not only that international law acknowledges their existence, but also multinational companies themselves at least in part influence the development of that law.In the concluding remarks the author notes that multinational (transnational) companies do not have all the elements of a full international personality, the one that is inherent to states. However, even if not complete their personality is beyond doubt. Although between them, depending on the case, there are major differences, there is no dispute that, from the perspective of international law, at least some multinational companies have the legal capacity (the ability to be the holder of a larger or smaller circle of rights and obligations established by international law), legal capacity (the ability to conclude international agreements, create international custom, etc.), tort capacity (the ability to provide for the legal bears responsibility for violating the norms of international law), process capability (active and passive legitimacy before some international courts), etc. In all likelihood, along with the expected further strengthening of the economic, but also political and every other power and role of the companies themselves, their international personality will also become more and more developed, At one point this will require global (universal) agreement which would precisely define rights, but, in particular, the duties and responsibilities of these entities.


Author(s):  
Higgins Dame Rosalyn, DBE, QC ◽  
Webb Philippa ◽  
Akande Dapo ◽  
Sivakumaran Sandesh ◽  
Sloan James

This chapter examines the powers or competences of the United Nations as a separate legal entity. Its possession of legal personality, its specialized agencies, and some of the separate legal entities in the UN family are concepts that are related but distinct from the powers of these bodies. The possession of international legal personality means that these bodies have their own rights and duties, and powers vested in them in their own right. However, the possession of legal personality does not define the particular powers of the organization, nor does it mean that they have plenary competence under international law or in municipal legal systems. The chapter discusses the relationship to legal personality; nature and scope; purposes and principles of the organization; division of competence between principal organs and subsidiary organs; domestic jurisdiction limitation of Article 2(7); substantive content of powers internationally and in domestic law; consequences of ultra vires acts.


Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin

This chapter provides a historical account of the manner in which the legal personality of armed groups was conceived and treated prior to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Conducting a detailed review of the law of belligerency and the legal framework of insurgency, the chapter demonstrates the different ways in which armed groups could acquire obligations under international law under these frameworks. During the course of this examination, the chapter pays particular attention to the relevance of territory, special agreements, State consent, and the armed group’s functionality. It concludes by analysing its findings against the evaluative framework set out in Chapter 3.


Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

Chapter 2 identifies and explains the four theoretical conceptions of international legal personality, which will be tested against historical and existing norms of positive international law in Chapters 3–8. With particular focus on the role attributed to the individual as the ultimate subject of international law, the examination will concentrate on selected scholars’ conclusions on the criteria for, and the consequences of acquiring, international legal personality. Moreover, it will address the way in which proponents of the various conceptions perceive the relationship between the international legal order and national legal order(s) and the role of the concept of international legal personality in that regard. Given that a primary aim of the book is to ascertain the position of the individual as a matter of international lex lata, particular attention is given to the two main conceptions of international legal personality, which both claim to be positivist.


Author(s):  
Sarooshi Dan

The law of international organizations (IOs) is undergoing profound changes, due in large part to the increasingly important role that these organizations have played in exercising powers conferred on them by national governments. This phenomenon has led to concerted attempts by states, international courts and tribunals, and domestic courts to ensure accountability for these exercises of power by imposing corresponding limits on IOs. This chapter focuses, first, on the development of international law relating to the legal personality of IOs, including in this context a brief consideration of the issue of immunity. It then discusses the relationship between states and IOs and the implications of this relationship for the responsibility of states, and in some cases the responsibility of IOs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dinah Shelton ◽  
Isabelle Cutting

This article examines the extent to which international legal obligations aimed at protecting the environment apply to military activities in peacetime and during armed conflict. The discussion draws on international environmental law, human rights law, the law of armed conflict, and the law of State responsibility in evaluating the extent to which States have a duty to prevent or mitigate environmental harm and remediate or compensate for any such damage caused by their military activities. The article also examines international law on liability for the injurious consequences of lawful activities, to assess whether this equitable doctrine supports shifting the clean-up costs of environmental harm to the acting State even when there is no breach of international law. The article concludes that international law requires measures be taken to prevent environmental harm and could support a claim for remediation or compensation where norms of international law have been breached. It also suggests the need to develop specific rules in peace treaties and status of forces or bases agreements, to address the consequences of environmental harm resulting from military activities.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter presents the conclusions of the book. It summarizes the argument of the book and makes some general observations about the process and effects of internationalization of armed conflicts in international law. Specifically, the chapter builds on the preceding analysis to argue that the study stands for a specific understanding of the notion of internationalized armed conflicts, one that is subject to an extensive application of the law of armed conflict. It further highlights some of the gaps in the legal regulation that result from the particular features of internationalized conflicts. The chapter closes by sketching potential directions in which the law and practice may develop in order to address those lacunae.


Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

Chapter 1 first sets the stage by describing, in Section 1.1, the current mainstream approach to the international legal personality of individuals. Section 1.2 then provides a concise outline of the book’s core arguments. Section 1.3 goes on to clarify a number of preliminary caveats, definitions, and assumptions, which form the basis of the analysis in the following chapters. First and foremost, Section 1.3 presents the book’s understanding of the term ‘individuals’, the relationship between international law and domestic law, and the distinction between primary and secondary rules. Lastly, Section 1.4 provides the reader with a guide to the subsequent chapters.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Anderson ◽  
Matthew C. Waxman

An international public debate over the law and ethics of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) has been underway since 2012, with those urging legal regulation of AWS under existing principles and requirements of the international law of armed conflict in argument with opponents who favour, instead, a preemptive international treaty ban on all such weapons. This chapter provides an introduction to this international debate, offering the main arguments on each side. These include disputes over defining an AWS, the morality and law of automated targeting and target selection by machine, and the interaction of humans and machines in the context of lethal weapons of war. Although the chapter concludes that a categorical ban on AWS is unjustified morally and legally—favouring the law of armed conflict’s existing case-by-case legal evaluation—it offers an exposition of arguments on each side of the AWS issue.


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