2 UK High Court of Justice: R. (on the application of the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain) v Central Arbitration Committee [2018] ewhc 3342 (Admin), 5 December 2018

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-901
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Geoffrey R. Watson

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)


2002 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 210-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Murjan ◽  
M. Shepherd ◽  
B. G. Ferguson

AIMS AND METHODWe conducted a questionnaire survey of all 120 health authorities and boards responsible for the commissioning of services for the assessment and treatment of transsexual people in England, Scotland and Wales, in order to identify the nature of the input offered and assess conformity to current international standards of care.RESULTSEighty-two per cent of the commissioning authorities responded and confirmed that most health authorities/boards provide a full service for the treatment of transsexuals, although this would be delivered at a local level in only 20% of cases. However, 11 commissioning authorities gave confused and inaccurate responses and three other health authorities appear to hold views on the commissioning of these specialist services that are not in keeping with the current legal situation and a recent High Court ruling, which establishes the right of transsexual people to NHS assessment and treatment.CLINICAL IMPLICATIONSThere are discrepancies in prioritisation and provision of clinical services for this group that are not standard across Great Britain.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifat Bitton

The decision in Noar Kahalacha, an anti-segregation in education case that was recently delivered by the Israeli High Court of Justice, has been ‘naturally’ celebrated as the ‘Israeli Brown’. But is it? This article points to the differences between the monumental US Supreme Court decision of Brown and the Israeli Brown-equivalent – Noar Kahalacha. It contends that the two cases bear differences that stem from the divergent patterns of discrimination they represent, and that they reflect these differences squarely. The discrimination patterns reflected by the cases differ by virtue of traits that are traditionally overlooked in antidiscrimination theoretical analysis. Comparing the two cases, therefore, allows us an opportunity to revisit the notion of discrimination and its antidote, antidiscrimination. Drawing on the dichotomous concepts of de jure/de facto discrimination and difference/sameness discrimination, the article shows how these dual theoretical notions are determinative in shaping the distinctiveness of each of these cases. While the African American victims in Brown were easily recognised as a distinctive group suffering from de jure discrimination, the Mizrahi victims in Noar Kahalacha – who suffer from de facto discrimination within a Jewish hegemonic society – lacked such clear recognition. Accordingly, the discrimination narrative that Noar Kahalacha provides is very incomplete and carries only limited potential for effective application in future struggles to eliminate discriminatory practices against Mizrahis in Israel. Brown, on the other hand, carries a converse trait. Though criticised, Brown, nevertheless, strongly signifies the recognition by White America of its overarching discriminatory practices, and implies a genuine dedication to break from it. This understanding further illuminates the limitations embedded in the possibility of ‘importing’ highly contextual antidiscrimination jurisprudence from abroad into our system's highly contextual reality of discrimination.


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