Finally, Our Own Brown! (?)

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifat Bitton
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Distinctive Group ◽  
Contextual Reality

The decision in Noar Kahalacha, an anti-segregation in education case that was recently delivered by the Israeli High Court of Justice, has been ‘naturally’ celebrated as the ‘Israeli Brown’. But is it? This article points to the differences between the monumental US Supreme Court decision of Brown and the Israeli Brown-equivalent – Noar Kahalacha. It contends that the two cases bear differences that stem from the divergent patterns of discrimination they represent, and that they reflect these differences squarely. The discrimination patterns reflected by the cases differ by virtue of traits that are traditionally overlooked in antidiscrimination theoretical analysis. Comparing the two cases, therefore, allows us an opportunity to revisit the notion of discrimination and its antidote, antidiscrimination. Drawing on the dichotomous concepts of de jure/de facto discrimination and difference/sameness discrimination, the article shows how these dual theoretical notions are determinative in shaping the distinctiveness of each of these cases. While the African American victims in Brown were easily recognised as a distinctive group suffering from de jure discrimination, the Mizrahi victims in Noar Kahalacha – who suffer from de facto discrimination within a Jewish hegemonic society – lacked such clear recognition. Accordingly, the discrimination narrative that Noar Kahalacha provides is very incomplete and carries only limited potential for effective application in future struggles to eliminate discriminatory practices against Mizrahis in Israel. Brown, on the other hand, carries a converse trait. Though criticised, Brown, nevertheless, strongly signifies the recognition by White America of its overarching discriminatory practices, and implies a genuine dedication to break from it. This understanding further illuminates the limitations embedded in the possibility of ‘importing’ highly contextual antidiscrimination jurisprudence from abroad into our system's highly contextual reality of discrimination.

scholarly journals The Contractual Interpretation of Tipping J

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comprehensive Examination ◽  
The Future ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Way

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian Frank ◽  
Bethany Moreton ◽  
Heather R. White
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Word Of God ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Sunday Morning ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
Civil Marriage ◽  
The Bible ◽  
The U.S

The lines seem so clearly drawn: A white evangelical minister stands in front of his California congregation on a Sunday morning. In one hand he holds a Bible. In the other is the text of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges extending civil marriage rights to same-sex couples throughout the country. “It’s time to choose,” he thunders to thousands of believers in the stadium-style worship center. “Will we follow the Word of God or the tyrannical dictates of government?” His declaration “This is who I stand with” is met with applause from the faithful as he dramatically flings the Court’s decision to the ground and tramples on it, waving the Bible in his upraised hand....

scholarly journals TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-474
Author(s):  
Katarina Trimmings
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Parental Responsibility ◽  
Habitual Residence ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Jurisdiction Rule

ARTICLE 8 of the Brussels IIa Regulation sets out the general rule regarding jurisdiction in intra-EU parental responsibility cases, namely that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member State of the habitual residence of the child. However, exceptionally, the court that has been seised of a case pursuant to Article 8 may not be the best placed to hear the case. To cater for such situations, the Regulation contains an innovative rule according to which a court that is seised of a case, and has jurisdiction on the substance, can transfer the case to a court of another Member State, if the latter is “better placed” to hear the case, and if the transfer is in the best interests of the child. Additionally, the transfer is subject to the condition that there is a “particular connection” between the child and the other Member State (e.g. the child is a national of that Member State). The “transfer of jurisdiction” rule, which is embodied in Article 15 of the Regulation, is at the heart of the Supreme Court decision in Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) (AIRE Centre and others intervening) [2016] UKSC 15; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 1103.

scholarly journals SINKRONISASI DAN DIFERENSIASI PUTUSAN HAKIM DALAM PENYELESAIAN KASUS-KASUS KEKERASAN DALAM RUMAH TANGGA

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tjokorda Istri Putra Astiti
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Violence ◽  
Gender Equity ◽  
Violence Against Women ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
District Court ◽  
Gender Justice ◽  
High Court ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
And Gender

This study specifically aims to assess synchronization and differentiation between the judge's decision, both horizontally and vertically, especially with regard todomestic violence cases. In addition, this study also intends to study about rule  whichare  applied by the Judges on the cases, and  reveal whether the  decision  under reviewreflects the gender justice This research is a legal normative research using case approach which wasexamined by studying the Judge’s decision in concrete cases, especially with regard todomestic violence. The number of decisions that were examined are six decisions whichconsists of three decisions of the District Court (Pengadilan Negeri) and  threedecisions  of the High Court (Pengadilan Tinggi). The decisions are determined bypurposive sampling.  Based on the analysis of the six decisions mentioned above ,  can be concludedas following:1)  The rule applied by the judge in hanling the concrete cases  regarding domestic violence particularly violence against women is on the Domestic Violence Act ( ActNo. 23/2004 ) with the application of a kind of sanction of imprisonment rangingfrom 1-3 months, that varied there the defendant was arrested some are droppedwith conditional (pidana bersyarat) (not being held prisoner) 2)  Among the three decisions of the District Court and the three decitions of the HighCourt which have analysed,  in one hand show synchronization and the other hand show differentiation.  In this case, synchronization and differentiation  can be seen vertically (between the District Court and the High Court decision), andhorizontally (between the District Court to each other) or between the decision ofthe High Court to each other).  3)  That the decision of the District and the High Court,  either have reflected gendersensitively and gender equity.

Judicial Review and Political Accountability: The Case of the High Court of Justice in Israel

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 448-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoav Dotan
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The Other ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Subject

The inter-relation between government policies, public opinion and court decisions are the subject of intense discussion in academic literature. Constitutional theorists maintain that courts are required to defend individual rights, especially minority rights. Courts are also expected to refrain from excessive interference in decision-making processes conducted by the other two branches of government. Both these themes are derived from the assumption that courts, unlike the legislature and the executive branch, are not representative institutions. They are not required to reflect the preferences of the majority in their decisions. Rather, the reverse is expected: to confront decisions which endanger the rights of minorities. The “success” of courts in maintaining their institutional autonomy — according to this view — is evaluated by their ability to withstand political pressures and effect their counter-majoritarian role.Political scientists, on the other hand, are concerned with the extent to which courts in fact fulfill this counter-majoritarian role. Some argue that the counter-majoritarian function of the court is no more than a doctrinal aspiration, perhaps even a myth. Constitutional courts, they argue, serve more to legitimize socio-political reforms and broader cultural propensities which were previously endorsed by the political establishment and public opinion, than to confront majoritarian decisions. Others maintain that, while courts are not wholly insulated from public opinion, they still manage, on many occasions, to retain their institutional autonomy vis-à-vis political pressures.

The Protection of Human Dignity in Interrogations: May Interrogative Torture Ever Be Tolerated? Reflections in Light of Recent German and Israeli Experiences

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 229-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Gur-Arye ◽  
Florian Jessberger
Keyword(s):  
War On Terror ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
High Court ◽  
Fair Treatment ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
German Court

The issue of whether interrogative torture may ever be tolerated has been discussed explicitly by both the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Frankfurt Regional Court in Germany. The Israeli court ruling related to the use of interrogative torture in the war on terror; the case brought before the German court was one of routine police work. This paper analyzes the two rulings in depth and offers a comparative reading of the rulings. The comparative analysis reveals that, despite some fundamental differences, the Israeli and German rulings should both be seen as an attempt to uphold the ban on torture, on the one hand, and yet to grant fair treatment to an individual interrogator who used, or threatened to use, force in order to save innocent lives, on the other. While determining the lessons to be learned from the German and Israeli experiences, this paper raises doubts as to whether it is possible to keep the ban on torture intact while either excusing the individual interrogator (Israel) or significantly mitigating his punishment (Germany). The paper further suggests that, in order to provide a real barrier against the practice of interrogative torture, the evidence resulting from such interrogations should be inadmissible in any criminal proceedings.

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