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2022 ◽  
Vol 2022 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Yao Xie

In order to improve the retrieval efficiency of civil litigation cases, the research introduces the fuzzy neural network algorithm and constructs a targeted retrieval algorithm system. In the simulation verification, it is found that, in the artificial subjective evaluation results of the expert group, the comprehensive score of reference cases given by the retrieval scheme exceeds the level of reference cases in the cases promoted and studied by the Supreme Court. The use of this scheme can effectively save the preparation time of prelitigation documents and help to improve the fairness and justice of the court trial process. It is proved that the retrieval scheme has certain popularization value.

2022 ◽  
Mark V. Tushnet

The Hughes Court: From Progressivism to Pluralism, 1930 to 1941 describes the closing of one era in constitutional jurisprudence and the opening of another. This comprehensive study of the Supreme Court from 1930 to 1941 – when Charles Evans Hughes was Chief Justice – shows how nearly all justices, even the most conservative, accepted the broad premises of a Progressive theory of government and the Constitution. The Progressive view gradually increased its hold throughout the decade, but at its end, interest group pluralism began to influence the law. By 1941, constitutional and public law was discernibly different from what it had been in 1930, but there was no sharp or instantaneous Constitutional Revolution in 1937 despite claims to the contrary. This study supports its conclusions by examining the Court's work in constitutional law, administrative law, the law of justiciability, civil rights and civil liberties, and statutory interpretation.

2022 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 11
Muhammad Roqib

Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD) is a constitution organ. This one of state institutions is established and empowered by the 1945 Constitution. The existence of the Regional Representative Council is regulated in the provision of Chapter VII Article 22 C and Article 22 D of the 1945 Constitution. The authorities and duties of the Regional Representative Council is regulated in No. 2/2018 of Law about the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), the House of Representative (DPR), the Regional Representative Council (DPD), and the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD). One of the Regional Representative Council’s authorities in the Law No. 2/2018 is able to monitor and evaluate the regional regulations plan and the regional regulations. However, since the verdict of Constitutional Court No. 137/PUU XIII/2015 and 56/PUU-XIV/2016 about revocation of the government authority (central) to nullify (executive review) the regional regulation, the authority of the Regional Representative Council in monitoring the regional regulations plan and the regional regulations is weakened and not clear. The nullification of the regional regulation(s) is owned by judicial institution only, such as the Supreme Court (MA). In fact, the Regional Representative Council should be as a representative council that can associate those two interests at once, the central government in top down way and regional interest in bottom up way. How does the Regional Representative Council align those two waves of interests at once through the regional regulation(s)? This research uses statute approach, by examining the related laws about law issues which is already analyzed and also uses conceptual approach, which starts from the point of views and developed doctrines in the legal studies. Based on the research results, it was known that the verdict of the Constitutional Court did not eliminate the control of the central government, in this case was the Regional Representative Council to the regional government, including the making of the regency/city regional regulations. But, this control was not in the shape of testing or nullifying the regional regulations. The Regional Representative Council in consort with the ministry, and governor as the representative of the central government should do some evaluation process on each regional regulations plan.

2022 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
David E. Vance

The Supreme Court and the Public Company Accounting Oversite Board (PCAOB) has said that an amount is material if there is a substantial likelihood it will influence a reasonable investor’s judgment. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has said that an amount is material if there is a substantial likelihood it will influence a reasonable user’s judgment. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has refused to define materiality. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has said that qualitative factors can make even small amounts material. Reasonable implies a consensus of opinion. This article is a meta-analysis of 31,155 materiality decisions made by 335 cohorts in 48 studies with the objective of defining what is reasonable. A cohort is a group of like individuals faced with a common materiality decision. Materiality in this study is measured as a percentage of net income. The mean threshold of materiality is 7.84% and the median is 6.81%. Both thresholds are substantially higher than the often-discussed threshold of 5.0%. A quarter of the participants in these studies set the threshold of materiality at 11.90% and the threshold for a statistically significant difference from the consensus is 17.51%. Ultimately, materiality will be decided through civil and criminal litigation. Finders of fact, usually jurors, will be asked to determine what a reasonable investor would conclude. Few jurors have the training and experience of investors, so without context, they can only guess what a reasonable investor would conclude. This study provides that context.

2022 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-208
L. A. Terekhova

The subject of the research is the additional powers of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in relation to cassation and supervisory complaints.The purpose of the article is to substantiate the necessity or redundancy of certain additional powers of the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court taking into account the nature of such powers and the conditions for their application.The methodology. Analysis and synthesis, dialectical method as well as formal legal interpretation of Russian legislative acts and judicial practice of Russian Supreme Court were used.The main results. Since the transformation of the three-tier supervisory proceedings into a system of two cassation and one supervisory instance, as well as the liquidation of the Supreme Arbitration Court, the powers of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation have spread to a fairly wide range of relations that allow influencing the movement of the case in the cassation and supervisory instance, and on itself initiation of a case in a supervisory instance. Moreover, such activities are far from always regulated by the norms of the law.The Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (or his deputy) currently has leverage over the possibility of considering a case in the cassation instance of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court) and in the supervisory instance (Presidium of the Supreme Court). These possibilities are called control and substitute in the article. Control powers should include: 1) regulation of key deadlines in cassation and supervisory proceedings; 2) interference in the procedure for filtering complaints. The procedure and conditions for the use of these powers are not regulated in the procedural codes. Having such powers in relation to procedural terms, the President of the Supreme Court actually influences the very possibility of initiating a case in a court of cassation or supervisory instance, as well as the duration (and, accordingly, the quality) of the examination of the complaint. The intervention of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in the procedure for filtering complaints has a clearly pronounced discretionary nature, moreover, it is selective. It would not be superfluous to point out that such as "order" in itself creates conditions for its abuse both by the participants in the case and by the courts. The substitute authority is the right of the Chairman of the Supreme Court to initiate supervisory proceedings on his own initiative, contrary to the basic rule of civil proceedings based on the principle of discretion (the case is initiated by the person whose rights have been violated). Supervisory proceedings are currently intended to appeal against judicial acts adopted by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation itself when considering cases in the first, appeal and cassation instances. However, among the objects of appeal there are also acts of the Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court, applications to which are possible with complaints against acts of any lower courts, with some restrictions on the decisions of justices of the peace (Article 390.4 of the Civil Procedure Code; Article 291.1 of the Arbitration Procedure Court). In this regard, the supervisory authority must continue to be viewed as the final link in the system of reviewing judicial acts. However, the system for reviewing judicial acts is very contradictory. On the one hand, there are a number of strict rules that cut off certain types of judicial acts from appeal; filtering complaints in the second cassation and supervision; establishing special rules for the jurisdiction of complaints. On the other hand, it is possible not to comply with these strict rules and directly contact the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.This extraordinary power of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has been preserved, precisely because the Russian legislator firmly and consistently adheres to the conviction that it is necessary to leave at least one official who is not a party to the case the right to initiate an audit of a judicial act.Conclusions. The extraordinary powers of the Chairman of the Supreme Court are of an extra-procedural nature, at best they are based on the rules of record keeping (instead of the law), are selective and opaque.

Leah West

Since the swift passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has had the unprecedented and highly controversial authority to take ‘reasonable and proportionate’ measures to reduce threats to Canadian security. While there are some limits to the types of measures CSIS can employ, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act permits the use of measures that would otherwise contravene the laws of Canada or limit a right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms so long as they are judicially authorized by the Federal Court. As new threats proliferate around the world, it is anticipated that CSIS will increasingly carry out this mandate overseas. Yet review bodies tasked with monitoring CSIS’s use of threat reduction measures (TRMs) report that CSIS has never sought judicial authorization to conduct a TRM. Why? One answer may be that CSIS has concluded that the Charter does not govern actions carried out abroad, and, as such, their extraterritorial conduct falls beyond the reach and oversight of the Federal Court. Whether the Charter applies to CSIS’s overseas conduct ostensibly lies in the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading case on the extraterritorial application of the Charter, R. v Hape. This article canvasses domestic and international law, as well as intelligence law theory, to explain why that presumption is wrong. Wrong, not least because the majority opinion in Hape is deeply flawed in its analysis and application of international law. But also, because intelligence operations are so distinguishable from the transnational criminal investigations at issue in Hape, the Court’s findings are inapplicable in the former context. In short, this article demonstrates that applying Hape to the actions of CSIS officers not only leaves their actions beyond the scrutiny of Canadian courts but also creates a significant human rights gap.

2022 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Nicky Winata ◽  
Winsherly Tan

Cartels as a Form of Unfair Business Competition KPPU often has difficulty proving it through direct evidence in accordance with Law No. 5/1999, so the alternative used by KPPU to obtain evidence is indirect evidence, and in practice this indirect evidence It is also not easy because it has not been regulated in Law No. 5/1999 so that the Supreme Court has not given any information regarding indirect evidence. The research method used by the author is normative research using library research to obtain data, and there is a need for clarity regarding procedural law from the KPPU. And the Authority of the KPPU in order to facilitate the handling of the KPPU on the Cartel Problem in Indonesia and amid the uncertainty of indirect evidence, the leniency of the program can also be used as an alternative in proving the occurrence of cartel actions carried out by business actors, and the application of evidence is not This directly was also adopted by other countries as well as the leniency program, and Indonesia also needs to follow this step to reduce cartels in Indonesia.

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