The Integrity Of The Rabbinic Law Of Purity (Mishnah Teharot)

Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Rubenstein
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jason P. Rosenblatt

The life of John Selden (1584–1654) was both contemplative and active. Seventeenth-century England’s most learned person, he continued in the Long Parliament of the 1640s his vigorous opposition, begun in the 1620s, to the abuses of power, whether by Charles I or, later, by the Presbyterian-controlled Westminster Assembly. His gift for finding analogies among different cultures—Greco-Roman, Christian, Jewish, and Islamic—helped to transform both the poetry and prose of the century’s greatest poet, John Milton. Regarding family law, the two might have influenced one another. Milton cites Selden, and Selden owned two of Milton’s treatises on divorce, published in 1645, both of them presumably acquired while he was writing Uxor Ebraica (1646). Selden accepted the non-biblically rabbinic, externally imposed, coercive Adamic/Noachide precepts as universal laws of perpetual obligation, rejecting his predecessor Hugo Grotius’ view of natural law as the innate result of right reason. He employed rhetorical strategies in De Jure Naturali et Gentium (“The Law of Nature and of Nations”) to prepare his readers for what might otherwise have shocked them: his belief in classic rabbinic law (halakha) as authoritative testimony. Although Selden was very active in the Long Parliament, his only surviving debates from that decade were as a lay member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. The Assembly’s scribe left so many gaps that the transcript is sometimes indecipherable. This book fills in the gaps and makes the speeches coherent by finding their contexts in Selden’s printed works, both the scholarly, as in the massive De Synedriis, but also in the witty and informal Table Talk.


Author(s):  
Catherine Hezser

Rabbinic law on women, children, and slaves developed on the basis of biblical law and in the context of the Greco-Roman and Sasanian cultural environments in which Palestinian and Babylonian rabbis lived. The discussions were innovative in their adaptation of biblical law to new circumstances. From a sociological point of view, women, children, and slaves were dependents of the householder who were generally associated with the private sphere of the household. At the same time, they differed from each other with regard to honor, which only free persons possessed, and with regard to gender, since male children were raised to become Torah-observant male Jews themselves. Palestinian rabbinic law shows interesting similarities with and differences to Roman law of which rabbis would have been aware even if direct influences cannot be established.


Author(s):  
Avi Shveka

There are two aspects to the question of the relation between biblical law and rabbinic halakhah: the historical one, which refers to the continuum between the two cultures, and the creative one, which refers to the conscious efforts of the rabbis to interpret the biblical text and to deduce halakhic details from it. This chapter deals primarily with the second aspect, and surveys the state of research of the literature of halakhic midrashim—focusing on their division into two tannaitic schools—as well as of the place of midrash in other rabbinic compilations, notably the Babylonian Talmud. Following this survey the chapter discusses several relevant historical questions, especially the question whether midrash is the true source of halakhah, or just a method to artificially link pre-existing halakhot to the biblical text. Based on the view that the nature of midrash is the impetus to extract from the biblical text answers to all halakhic questions which bother the reader, whether or not they are actually referred to in the text, the chapter suggests several arguments in favor of the former view. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the great historical question of the continuity between biblical law and rabbinic halakhah. The chapter proposes studying halakhah from a longue durée perspective, which will enable us to approach this question on an evidential basis, and sketches some of the methodologies and research developments needed to advance this goal.


2014 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-339
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Schwartz

When the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court conclude that some law, or some decision of a lower court, violates the U.S. Constitution, no great difficulties of principle or sentiment need accompany their decision to abrogate the opinions of the earlier legislators or judges. The justices, and others, are expected to understand their decision either as correcting a mistake that had been introduced by fallible people who, with intentions good or bad, or unintentionally, had violated the system's basic rulebook, or as reflecting the fact that since the time those legislators or judges made their decisions something relevant (such as notions of “cruel and unusual punishment” or of what affects interstate commerce) had changed, so what was once constitutionally acceptable no longer is. Thus, however upsetting the substance of the justices’ decision may be, it need not imply a condemnation of their predecessors nor entail a disruption of the system's authority structures—as is seen in the fact that the justices, and American citizens, readily use such explicit verbs as “reverse,” “strike down,” or “overturned” for what the justices do


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document