The Rhetoric of Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides

In several key passages in Thomas Hobbes's understudied translation of Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, Hobbes's Pericles directs audiences to distrust rhetoric in favor of calculative self-interest, inward-focused affective states, and an epistemic reliance on sovereignty. Hobbes's own intervention via his translation of Thucydides involves similar rhetorical moves. By directing readers to learn from Thucydides, Hobbes conceals his own rhetorical appeals in favor of sovereignty while portraying rhetoric undermining sovereignty as manipulative, self-serving, and representative of the entire category of “rhetoric.” Hobbes's double redescription of rhetoric is an important starting point for an early modern project: appeals that justify a desired political order are characterized as “right reason,” “the law of nature,” or “enlightenment,” while rhetoric constituting solidarities or publics outside the desired order is condemned. Hobbes's contribution to this project theorizes rhetoric as a barrier to individual calculations of interest, placing a novel constraint on political life.

Right for the wrong reason; wrong for the right reason: Gibson and Arnheim on picture perception

Although J J Gibson’s theory of picture perception was often crude and biased toward naturalism, its fundamental division between the visual world and the visual field made it a semiotic theory. Contrariwise, although Arnheim wrote sensitively on pictures, he never seemed to admit that they were signs. This paper reviews both Gibson’s and Arnheim’s theories of picture perception, and explains where Arnheim’s biases caused him to lose the possibility of framing his approach in the most basic semiotic terms. Nevertheless, using the phenomenological semiotics of Sonesson and his theory of the Lifeworld Hierarchy, I demonstrate latent semiotic elements in Arnheim’s theory, due perhaps to Alfred Schutz’s influence. Hoping to argue against the brute theory of denotation, Arnheim instead sought to delay invocation of (conventional) signs as long as possible, and his idea of iconic pictorialization assumes but does not name signification. Nevertheless, I propose that Arnheim has a kind of theory of the Lifeworld Hierarchy inside the picture. Thus, he (wrongly) does not see the picture as overtly signifying but interestingly gives hints about how to treat the objects of the virtual world of the picture based on their relationship to the overall style of the work.

Active Information, Learning, and Knowledge Acquisition

Philosophers frequently define knowledge as justified, true belief. In this paper we build a mathematical framework that makes possible to define learning (increased degree of true belief) and knowledge of an agent in precise ways. This is achieved by phrasing belief in terms of epistemic probabilities, defined from Bayes' Rule. The degree of true belief is then quantified by means of active information $I^+$, that is, a comparison between the degree of belief of the agent and a completely ignorant person. Learning has occurred when either the agent's strength of belief in a true proposition has increased in comparison with the ignorant person ($I^+>0$), or if the strength of belief in a false proposition has decreased ($I^+<0$). Knowledge additionally requires that learning occurs for the right reason, and in this context we introduce a framework of parallel worlds, of which one is true and the others are counterfactuals. We also generalize the framework of learning and knowledge acquisition to a sequential setting, where information and data is updated over time. The theory is illustrated using examples of coin tossing, historical events, future events, replication of studies, and causal inference.

MERUNTUHKAN FORMALITAS PENDIDIKAN KRISTEN, Hakikat Holistika PAK

Christian Education has been trapped mere formality. Instead, it’s has a huge responsibility on growing up the morality of a certain person or a community. Morality is a matter of values. Sometimes, many of us have no real idea of the right thing to do. Therefore we need the moral knowlegde to tell us what is the right thing to do. This study is an effort to emphasize the general way in which morality and moral are used. The explanation is necessary because of the many different definitions that exist for these terms, especially in relation to the concepts of ethics. Generallly, in this study, ethics and moral is treat as synonym, which means that the using of moral or morality does not imply any demarcation from ethical or ethics. God wants his people to do the right thing by the right reason. These right act and behaviour is motivated by intention of a heart that wants to please God only.

What’s suffering got to do with it? A qualitative study of suffering in the context of Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID)

Background Intolerable suffering is a common eligibility requirement for persons requesting assisted death, and although suffering has received philosophic attention for millennia, only recently has it been the focus of empirical inquiry. Robust theoretical knowledge about suffering is critically important as modern healthcare provides persons with different options at end-of-life to relieve suffering. The purpose of this paper is to present findings specific to the understanding and application of suffering in the context of MAID from nurses’ perspectives. Methods A longitudinal qualitative descriptive study using semi-structured telephone interviews. Inductive analysis was used to construct a thematic account. The study received ethical approval and all participants provided written consent. Results Fifty nurses and nurse practitioners from across Canada were interviewed. Participants described the suffering of dying and provided insights into the difficulties of treating existential suffering and the iatrogenic suffering patients experienced from long contact with the healthcare system. They shared perceptions of the suffering that leads to a request for MAID that included the unknown of dying, a desire for predictability, and the loss of dignity. Eliciting the suffering story was an essential part of nursing practice. Knowledge of the story allowed participants to find the balance between believing that suffering is whatever the persons says it is, while making sure that the MAID procedure was for the right person, for the right reason, at the right time. Participants perceived that the MAID process itself caused suffering that resulted from the complexity of decision-making, the chances of being deemed ineligible, and the heighted work of the tasks of dying. Conclusions Healthcare providers involved in MAID must be critically reflective about the suffering histories they bring to the clinical encounter, particularly iatrogenic suffering. Further, eliciting the suffering stories of persons requesting MAID requires a high degree of skill; those involved in the assessment process must have the time and competency to do this important role well. The nature of suffering that patients and family encounter as they enter the contemplation, assessment, and provision of MAID requires further research to understand it better and develop best practices.

The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple

The simple knowledge norm of assertion (SKNA) holds that one may (epistemically permissibly) assert that p only if one knows that p. Turri (Aust J Philos 89(1):37–45, 2011) and Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express knowledge norm of assertion (EKNA). I defend SKNA and argue against EKNA. First, I argue that EKNA faces counterexamples. Second, I argue that EKNA assumes an implausible view of permissibility on which an assertion is epistemically permissible only if it is made for a right reason, i.e., a reason that contributes to making it the case that it is epistemically permissible to make that assertion. However, the analogous view in other normative domains is both controversial and implausible. This is because it doesn’t make it possible for one to act or react rightly for the wrong reason. I suggest that proponents of EKNA have conflated requirements for φ-ing rightly (or permissibly) with requirements for φ-ing well. Finally, I argue that proponents of SKNA can explain the intuitive defectiveness of asserting on the basis of an epistemically bad reason (e.g., a random guess), even when the asserters know the content of their assertion, by arguing that the asserters are epistemically blameworthy.

John Selden

The life of John Selden (1584–1654) was both contemplative and active. Seventeenth-century England’s most learned person, he continued in the Long Parliament of the 1640s his vigorous opposition, begun in the 1620s, to the abuses of power, whether by Charles I or, later, by the Presbyterian-controlled Westminster Assembly. His gift for finding analogies among different cultures—Greco-Roman, Christian, Jewish, and Islamic—helped to transform both the poetry and prose of the century’s greatest poet, John Milton. Regarding family law, the two might have influenced one another. Milton cites Selden, and Selden owned two of Milton’s treatises on divorce, published in 1645, both of them presumably acquired while he was writing Uxor Ebraica (1646). Selden accepted the non-biblically rabbinic, externally imposed, coercive Adamic/Noachide precepts as universal laws of perpetual obligation, rejecting his predecessor Hugo Grotius’ view of natural law as the innate result of right reason. He employed rhetorical strategies in De Jure Naturali et Gentium (“The Law of Nature and of Nations”) to prepare his readers for what might otherwise have shocked them: his belief in classic rabbinic law (halakha) as authoritative testimony. Although Selden was very active in the Long Parliament, his only surviving debates from that decade were as a lay member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. The Assembly’s scribe left so many gaps that the transcript is sometimes indecipherable. This book fills in the gaps and makes the speeches coherent by finding their contexts in Selden’s printed works, both the scholarly, as in the massive De Synedriis, but also in the witty and informal Table Talk.

The Problem of Moral Progress and Stoic Cosmopolitanism

The article is devoted to showing the connection between the moral progress and the cos­mopolitanism of the Stoic. Since the early Stoics considered the right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) as one of the basic conditions for the unification of gods and humankind into a single com­munity (κοσμόπολις), anyone who intends to join to this community must develop his or her reason to the highest level. It means that the cosmopolitan must be morally perfect, which implies that he or she has successfully completed the process of moral progress. However, the concept of moral progress in Stoicism (especially in the early one) is prob­lematic because the Stoics denied a qualitative difference between vicious people and be­lieved that all bad deeds are equal. The author of the article tries to remove this contradic­tion by introducing a two-level structure of moral progress, in which the gradation of moral development and qualitative changes in the moral character of the subject are spaced. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and their ideas about moral progress are united not only by the concept of «right reason», but also by their doctrine of «oikeiôsis», which implies the development of natural inclinations to the highest principles of morality. Finally, the inter­dependence of moral progress and the cosmopolitanism is demonstrated by their evolution with the development of the Stoic school. This evolution is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, the Stoics perfected the tools for moral development, which paved a clearer path to the cosmopolis, and on the other hand, they reduced the requirements for the citi­zens of the cosmopolis, which also led to the growth of the community of gods and people.

Cosmopolitanism, Imperialism, and the Idea of Law

The cosmopolitan idea that humans have wider and more universal allegiances than to their immediate communities is presented by Cicero in On the commonwealth in both Platonic and Stoic forms. In On laws the more evidently Stoic idea of law as prescriptive right reason governs his argument. The chapter explains what Cicero takes its universal prescriptive force to consist in, and the way he conceives it to be embodied in the law codes of well-regulated constitutions of particular states, whether the Roman Republic at its best or any other ‘good and stable nation’. In On the commonwealth he had argued for the thesis that such states cannot exist or conduct their affairs without justice, which in Book 3 is the focus of a full-scale debate, particularly concerned with the justice or injustice of imperialism, not least Roman imperialism.