The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony

Mikkel Gerken

doi:10.1177/0048393115600527

Norms of Testimony in Broad Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Quantum Mechanics in Critical Theory

Journal for General Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1007/s10838-020-09523-5 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Rasmus Jaksland

Keyword(s):

Quantum Mechanics ◽

Critical Theory ◽

Case Studies ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Interactional Expertise ◽

Karen Barad ◽

Scientific Testimony

Abstract While much interdisciplinarity brings together proximate fields, broad interdisciplinarity sees integration between disciplines that are perceived to be non-neighboring. This paper argues that the heterogeneity among disciplines in broad interdisciplinarity calls for stricter epistemic norms of testimony for experts that act as translators between the disciplines than those suggested for intra-scientific testimony. The paper is structured around two case studies: the affective turn in social theorizing and the use of quantum mechanics in critical theory as exemplified by Vicky Kirby’s use of work by Karen Barad. These are argued to be instances of broad interdisciplinary borrowing where few translators have joint expertise in both disciplines. For most, therefore, the engagement with for instance the integration between quantum mechanics and critical theory is possible only by the aid of translators. For those without sufficient interactional expertise, however, the epistemic credentials of the translations they inevitably rely upon are inscrutable. Furthermore, any comparison between translations is challenged since translations are argued to be few due to the cognitive divergence between disciplines in broad interdisciplinarity. Consequently, the epistemic integrity of broad interdisciplinarity can only be secured through additional norms of testimony for translators. The paper proposes that (a) all translator’s testimony in broad interdisciplinarity must aim to be neutral with respect to disputed issues within the relevant disciplines and (b) any deviation from (a) must be clearly highlighted.

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Testimony and Assertion

10.1093/oso/9780198713234.003.0010 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

David Owens

Keyword(s):

Speech Acts ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Epistemology Of Testimony ◽

Ethical Norms

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding speech acts like promising and the epistemic norms that govern the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by (intentionally) expressing belief. The expression of belief is distinguished from the communication of belief. The chapter goes on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory, arguing that memory and testimony are mechanisms that can preserve the rationality of the belief they transmit without preserving the evidence on which the belief was originally based.

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The Epistemic Norms of Action

10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0007 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Mikkel Gerken

Keyword(s):

Explanatory Power ◽

Epistemic Norm ◽

Epistemic Normativity ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Knowledge Norm ◽

Knowledge Ascriptions ◽

Epistemological Principle ◽

Knowledge Norms

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.

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Adversarial Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay Jurors: A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform

American Journal of Law & Medicine ◽

10.1017/s0098858800006353 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 21 (2-3) ◽

pp. 281-300

Author(s):

Jody Weisberg Menon

Keyword(s):

General Theory ◽

Legal System ◽

Medical Malpractice ◽

Common Knowledge ◽

Common Law ◽

Expert Witnesses ◽

Malpractice Reform ◽

The Right ◽

Scholarly Attention ◽

Scientific Testimony

Pleas for reform of the legal system are common. One area of the legal system which has drawn considerable scholarly attention is the jury system. Courts often employ juries as fact-finders in civil cases according to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved … .” The general theory behind the use of juries is that they are the most capable fact-finders and the bestsuited tribunal for arriving at the most accurate and just outcomes. This idea, however, has been under attack, particularly by those who claim that cases involving certain difficult issues or types of evidence are an inappropriate province for lay jurors who typically have no special background or experience from which to make informed, fair decisions.The legal system uses expert witnesses to assist triers of fact in understanding issues which are beyond their common knowledge or difficult to comprehend.

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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Sebastian Schmidt

Keyword(s):

Conclusive Evidence ◽

Normative Reasons ◽

Epistemic Reasons ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Plausible Assumption ◽

Reasons For Belief ◽

Normative Force ◽

Epistemic Trust ◽

Conceptual Connection ◽

Epistemic Blame

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.

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Epistemic Norms and the Limits of Epistemology

Hinge Epistemology ◽

10.1163/9789004332386_010 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 156-175

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Norms

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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?

10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0008 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher J. G. Meacham

Keyword(s):

Utility Theory ◽

Utility Functions ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Degrees Of Belief ◽

Epistemic Utility

Meacham takes aim at the epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief and where the norms encode ways of adopting non-dominated degrees of belief. He focuses on a particularly popular subclass of such views where epistemic utility is determined solely by the accuracy of degrees of belief. Meacham argues that these types of epistemic utility arguments for norms are (i) not compatible with each other (so not all can be correct), (ii) do not solely rely on accuracy considerations, and (iii) are not able to capture intuitive norms about how we ought to respond to evidence.

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How we learn whiteness: Disciplining and resisting management knowledge

Management Learning ◽

10.1177/13505076211061622 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 135050762110616

Author(s):

Helena Liu

Keyword(s):

Intellectual History ◽

Racial Inequality ◽

Research Review ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Institutional Frameworks ◽

Management Knowledge ◽

Global North

In management studies, whiteness is learnt through the discipline’s epistemic norms and conventions, received intellectual history, conceptual canon, driving logics and institutional frameworks. The foundational white epistemology of management produces and secures racial inequality while insisting that race is irrelevant and racism is obsolete in a post-racial imaginary. In this conceptual piece, I explore how scholars of colour and our knowledge experience a phenomenon of seen invisibility. This dialectical condition is reproduced through mechanisms and practices by which our discipline is disciplined within the prevailing racial order. After analysing examples of these normalised mechanisms and practices through the testimonies of scholars of colour who research, review, teach and edit management theorising in the Global North, I discuss how we might unlearn whiteness in our discipline through epistemic resistance.

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