Intelligence and Arms Control: Challenges in Strategic Nuclear Force Monitoring, Charles A. Appleby, Dennis M. Gormley, and Jill L. Jermano. 1992. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 224 pages. ISBN: 0-8133-8323-4. $34.95

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-59
1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
Herbert Scoville

In speaking about arms control negotiations in a multipolar world, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not really in a multipolar world right now. But perhaps we are starting toward one, at least as far as nuclear power is concerned. Britain, France, and China possess only relatively small nuclear forces at present but they will grow in time and eventually will have to be taken into consideration at least in arms control negotiations involving nuclear weapons. France and Britain at the present do have a nuclear deterrent force which would deter an attack as far as the Soviets are concerned. The status of the Chinese nuclear force is very much more uncertain. It is possible that they now possess a very limited deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union. Certainly there is no question that at the present time they do not have any means by which they can threaten, even in retaliation, a nuclear attack against the United States. As a consequence, the Chinese do not provide any direct threat to us and we can go ahead and negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union without any real consideration of Chinese participation. One need not conclude from the growing Chinese nuclear power that they must necessarily be brought into the SALT negotiations in the near future.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 548-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Lain Johnston

In this article I argue that China currently has the technical capacity to increase the size of its nuclear forces by about two to three times and to improve its operational flexibility.1 Whether it does so or not will depend primarily on four variables or constraints: trends in thinking about nuclear doctrine that justify these sorts of changes; the economic and technological resources available; China′s commitment to nuclear arms-related arms control conventions; and strategic and arms control decisions by the United States. I suggest that for the foreseeable future the variables relating to doctrine, economics/technology and Chinese arms control preferences are all relatively fixed or constant. That is, present trends in all three suggest a continuing will and ability to modernize Chinese nuclear forces. The last variable is somewhat less fixed, and thus may be the one that is most amenable to external manipulation.


2005 ◽  
Vol 61 (6) ◽  
pp. 16-18
Author(s):  
Jai Singh
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. Shaver ◽  
Michael F. Altfeld ◽  
Regina Gaillard ◽  
John Scott
Keyword(s):  

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Keyword(s):  

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