Nuclear warfare beyond counterforce

A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent's nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when hardening and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make executing a counterforce strategy against an adversary's nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multiple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary's nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider striking with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country's remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from responding. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be controlled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes.

A Closure for the Virtual Origin of Turbulent Plumes

An isolated source of surface buoyancy, be it a campfire or burning city, gives rise to a turbulent plume. Well above the surface, the plume properties asymptote to the well-known solutions of Morton, Taylor, and Turner (MTT), but a closure is still lacking for the virtual origin. A closure for the virtual origin is sought here in the case of a turbulent plume sustained by a circular source of surface buoyancy in an unstratified and unsheared fluid. In the high Reynolds number limit, it is argued that all such plumes asymptote to a single solution. Direct numerical simulation (DNS) of this solution exhibits a virtual origin located a distance below the surface equal to 1.1 times the radius of the buoyancy source. This solution is compared to the previously used assumption that the MTT plume is fully spun-up at the surface, and that assumption is found to give buoyancies that are off by an order of magnitude. With regards to the citywide firestorm triggered by the nuclear attack on Hiroshima, it is found that the spun-up-at-surface MTT solution would have trapped radioactive soot within about a hundred meters of the surface, whereas the DNS solution presented here corroborates observations of the plume reaching well into the troposphere.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS’ NUCLEAR RETHORIC – A PERPETUAL DILEMMA AND VARIOUS STANCES

Actors struggle in the nuclear power games is more symbolic one, due to the fact that it is believed that a nuclear attack nowadays is not likely to happen, since it is generally-accepted that nations cannot reliably defend against a nuclear attack by using traditional means. Therefore, the present paper aims to emphasize the role of actors’ nuclear rethoric in pursuing nuclear objectives. The document analyzes the nuclear doctrine of the first three most powerful nuclear-states, highlighting the potential of strategic communication.

“Only I Am the Brahma”: Religion and Narrative in the Netflix Thriller Series Sacred Games (2018–2019)

Sacred Games (2018–2019), based on Vikram Chandra’s novel of the same title, is India’s first Netflix crime thriller series. This series shows how the lives of a Sikh policeman, Sartaj Singh, and a powerful gangster, Ganesh Eknath Gaitonde, weave together in a mission to save Mumbai from a nuclear attack. The series immediately received critical acclaim and viewers’ appreciation, but the way the series represents the (mis)use of metanarratives of religious and political ideologies, as they come to influence Gaitonde’s life, needs further perusal. For this purpose, this article investigates how Gaitonde’s life, and its abrupt end, are shaped and challenged by the larger ideological and religious metanarratives of his milieu. At the same time, this article examines Gaitonde’s ability to gain control over his own narrative despite the overwhelming presence of these metanarratives. More specifically, Gaitonde’s transgressive will and his desire to tell his story are brought under scrutiny. Along with the analysis of Gaitonde’s character, this article also examines how the use of various cinematic and narrative techniques heightens self-reflexivity and metafictionality in Sacred Games and emphasizes the role of mini-narratives as unique, singular, and contingent, in contrast to the generic, universal, and permanent tones of metanarratives.

Getting to Stalemate

This chapter analyzes how much nuclear retaliatory capability must countries build to reliably deter nuclear attack and how easy is it to establish nuclear stalemate. It discusses competing views and explains why the outcome of the debate is crucial for understanding the central puzzle of the nuclear age. One view holds that even minimal nuclear arsenals are “enough” to create stalemate, while another contends that stalemate requires far more robust nuclear forces and the virtual certainty of retaliation. However, the chapter also shows that minimal arsenals have not been enough. It looks into the intense rivalry of the Cold War, in which the threshold of nuclear capability required to generate deterrence was higher than the capability to create the mere possibility of retaliation.

Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability

Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests an alternative logic. Given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, uncertain retaliation can have a strong deterrent effect, and assured retaliation is not necessary. A simplified nuclear exchange model developed to evaluate China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the United States in 2000 and 2010 shows that China's nuclear retaliatory capability has been and remains far from assured. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States promised to maintain strategic stability with China; therefore, the 2010 scenario can be considered as a baseline for China-U.S. strategic stability. Both China and the United States are developing or modernizing their strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The technical competition between China and the United States favors each in different ways. A hypothetical scenario of China versus the United States in 2025 reveals that China-U.S. strategic stability will likely be maintained at no lower than its 2010 level.

Cyber-attacks on Saudi Arabia Environment

Even though cyber-attacks can’t be compared to a nuclear attack but they both pose a serious threat to national and international security. As we witness today cyberwarfare is increasing and Saudi Arabia has become a major target of Cyber-attacks as a result of its economic and digital revolution, high technology adoption and the growth of the gas and oil industry. This paper presents, a case study of the cyber-attacks on the Saudi environment. We focused on two specific malwares Shamoon and Mamba Ransomware. It also explores their methodologies and structure for future defense