Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
2012 ◽
Vol 102
(2)
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pp. 720-749
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Keyword(s):
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were “lenient” in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were “forgiving” in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)
2006 ◽
Vol 30
(2)
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pp. 159-180
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2019 ◽
Vol 101
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pp. 47-53
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1994 ◽
Vol 168
(2)
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pp. 117-130
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2014 ◽
Vol 10
(3)
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pp. 235-262
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2007 ◽
Vol 63
(3)
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pp. 384-393
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