A Static Approximation for Dynamic Demand Substitution with Applications in a Competitive Market

2008 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 630-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wallace J. Hopp ◽  
Xiaowei Xu
2004 ◽  
pp. 76-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Gimpelson

The article discusses the issue of shortage of skills in the Russian industry. Using microdata from a survey of industrial enterprises, the author confirms that most of employers complain of difficulties in hiring and attaching skilled workers. In case of mass occupations, this shortage relates mostly to low efficient enterprises, which are unable or unwilling to pay competitive market going wage. More efficient and better paying firms are less likely to face shortage of general skills on the labor market but may face limited supply of specific skills.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Xu ◽  
Maxwell B. Stinchcombe ◽  
Andrew B. Whinston
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Leigh Kohn ◽  
Robert H. Patrick
Keyword(s):  

1993 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary E. Harston

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the demand for independent audits and the German accounting profession evolved from the late 1800s to the early 1930s despite the absence of competitive market forces. The paper posits that cultural ideologies, specifically with respect to nationalism, paternalism and anti-individualism, provide reasons for the unique configuration of not only the German corporate/banking structures responsible for originating financial reports but the accounting profession that audited them. As the German accounting profession was in an embryonic stage, it was not capable of successfully confronting the corporate/banking alliance to significantly impact financial reporting or the demand for audits. Economic crises served as the dominant pressure for business reform and legislation mandating audits in Germany.


Author(s):  
Richard Adelstein

This chapter distinguishes torts from crimes in terms of the moral costs created by crimes, discusses the nature and incidence of these costs and the problems of assigning liability prices to compensate for them, and describes criminal liability as organized vengeance, a means of inflicting visible, proportioned suffering on offenders as compensation for the moral costs imposed by crimes. The ideas of retribution and deterrence are illustrated in the case of competitive market prices, which also separate efficient from inefficient cost imposition through retribution. Criminal entitlements are defined and distinguished from tortious entitlements, and the differences and connections between tort and criminal liability are explored. In seeking punishment that fits the crime in every case, criminal liability also seeks corrective justice, in this context called proportional punishment, rather than absolute deterrence, and through retributive liability pricing effectively encourages crimes whose value to the perpetrator exceeds the moral costs they impose.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document