Shortfall Risk Models When Information on Loss Function Is Incomplete

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erick Delage ◽  
Shaoyan Guo ◽  
Huifu Xu

Utility-based shortfall risk measures effectively captures a decision maker's risk attitude on tail losses. In this paper, we consider a situation where the decision maker's risk attitude toward tail losses is ambiguous and introduce a robust version of shortfall risk, which mitigates the risk arising from such ambiguity. Specifically, we use some available partial information or subjective judgement to construct a set of plausible utility-based shortfall risk measures and define a so-called preference robust shortfall risk as through the worst risk that can be measured in this (ambiguity) set. We then apply the robust shortfall risk paradigm to optimal decision-making problems and demonstrate how the latter can be reformulated as tractable convex programs when the underlying exogenous uncertainty is discretely distributed.

Stat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hengrui Cai ◽  
Rui Song ◽  
Wenbin Lu

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.


2021 ◽  
pp. 103418
Author(s):  
Xiangqian Zhu ◽  
Wenfeng Wang ◽  
Suhong Pang ◽  
Chaoyin An ◽  
Xiaoliang Yang ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Conforti ◽  
Francesca Guerriero ◽  
Rosita Guido ◽  
Marco Matucci Cerinic ◽  
Maria Letizia Conforti

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