Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game

To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain [Formula: see text] or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals [Formula: see text] would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

Loss of resistance to punishment of cocaine use after prior experience

ABSTRACTOne behavioral feature of drug addiction is continued drug use despite awareness that this causes negative consequences. Attempts to model this feature in animals typically involve punishing drug self-administration with a brief electrical footshock and look for resistance to punishment. Though all individual animals eventually stop self-administering the drug with increasing intensity of punishment, some individuals do so at higher intensities than other individuals. The greater relative resistance to punishment of the former individuals is generally interpreted as evidence for a compulsion-like behavior. Here we show that resistance to footshock punishment is in fact not a stable individual behavioral feature. Specifically, when rats are retested for their resistance to increasing intensity of footshock punishment, they become much less resistant. As a result, they suppress their cocaine intake even when punished with an initially low and ineffective intensity. A series of original behavioral experiments reveals that this low resistance to footshock punishment is rapidly acquired after rats experience a punishment intensity that leads them to near-completely suppress their cocaine intake. Passive exposure to the same intensity does not induce this effect. Once acquired, low resistance to punishment persists during at least one month, but can nevertheless be extinguished by retesting rats on a daily basis. Interestingly, this acquired low resistance to footshock punishment does not generalize to a non-painful form of punishment (i.e., histamine) that is also seldom used in animal drug self-administration studies. We discuss some possible theoretical and methodological implications of these findings for future research on animal models of compulsion-like behavior.

Is it a painful error? The effect of unpredictability and intensity of punishment on the error-related negativity, and somatosensory evoked potentials

Recent findings showed that an unpredictable context increases the amplitude of the Error-Related Negativity (ERN), a cognitive Event-Related Potential (ERP) that appears after the commission of an error. Interestingly, this effect has only been studied using unpredictable, performance-unrelated stimuli. In many situations, however, it is the consequence of the error itself that is unpredictable. The present study examined how predictable and unpredictable punishment intensity contingent on error commission differentially modulated ERN amplitudes. Using high-density EEG, we recorded the ERN in 40 healthy volunteers while they performed an arrowhead version of the Eriksen flanker task under three conditions: Errors were either consistently punished with (1) predictable nonpainful, (2) predictable painful, or (3) unpredictable (50% painful/50% nonpainful) electrical stimulation. Furthermore, we examined whether individual differences in trait anxiety modulated the effect. Contrary to our predictions, ERN amplitudes did not differ across conditions, nor were there any differences between low and high anxiety groups. Nevertheless, the effects of predictability and intensity were present in Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEPs) elicited by the punishments. N1 amplitudes were increased for painful compared to nonpainful stimulation. P2 amplitudes were increased for painful compared to nonpainful, and for unpredictable compared to predictable stimulation, whereas the Late Positive Potential (LPP) was increased for unpredictable compared to predictable stimulation. Overall, these results demonstrate that unpredictability and increased painfulness of punishment (1) enhanced the potential motivational significance of the errors, but (2) did not potentiate ERN amplitudes beyond the ones elicited by errors punished with predictable nonpainful stimulation.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

Preprint: What stops revenge taking? Effects of observed emotional reactions on revenge seeking

What reaction stops revenge taking? Four experiments (total N=191) examined this question where the victim of an interpersonal transgression could observe the offender’s reaction (anger, sadness, pain, or calm) to a retributive noise punishment. We compared the punishment intensity selected by the participant before and after seeing the offender’s reaction. Seeing the opponent in pain reduced subsequent punishment most strongly, while displays of sadness and verbal indications of suffering had no appeasing effect. Expression of anger about a retributive punishment did not increase revenge seeking relative to a calm reaction, even when the anger response was disambiguated as being angry with the punisher. It is concluded that the expression of pain is the most effective emotional display for the reduction of retaliatory aggression. The findings are discussed in the light of recent research on reactive aggression and retributive justice.

Game Research on Coal Mine Workers’ Off-Post Behaviors

In order to seek for causes and solutions of off-post behaviors of coal miners, static and evolutionary games were utilized on the basis of an established strategy simulation model between coal mine enterprise and coal miners. These games were used to determine the revenue matrix of two game parties given off-post behaviors of coal miners from two levels (coal miners and coal mine enterprise). Thus, equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary analyses of the two parties should be conducted. Results indicated that, in the enterprise’s perspective, inspection cost and punishment intensity are important factors that influence the safety production and economic benefit of coal mine enterprises; in the coal miners’ perspective, wage loss and the constraint degree it generates are essential factors. Furthermore, these factors constitute a key to solving off-post behaviors of coal miners. Reasonability of the established simulation model was analyzed and verified on the basis of off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine that belongs to Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. The coal mine enterprise should enhance the inspection of safety production and establish scientific and complete off-post punishment mechanism. Moreover, the coal mine enterprise should provide proper compensation, treatment, and reward policies of workers to reduce the off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine enterprise effectively.

Administration of punishment in school

Giving consideration to punishment, one of the inevitable elements of school discipline, always reactivates the issue of punishment administration and its effects in school setting. Punishment is administered by a beforehand-determined intention, its general and final goal being the attempt to make a child change his/her behavior so as to more successfully take part in school life. The issue of how much it is justifiable to administer punishment, as a way of directing child?s behavior, is not only raised in professional discussions but occurs as a personal dilemma with parents, teachers and all those involved in child upbringing. The definition of punishment contains certain incompatible elements in attitudes, which is reflected in punishment administration within different social contexts. Based on the analysis of research results, the paper discusses all the elements the teacher should be well acquainted with, influencing the effectiveness of punishment. The effects of punishment administration depend, among other things, on the type of punishment, way in which a person experiences and perceives punishment and the way of administering it. Prior to punishment administration, as a means of directing child?s behavior factors influencing successfulness of punishment should be established consistency in punishment administration, postponement of punishment intensity of punishment, explanation for punishment administration, nature of interrelations between a child and a person punishing him/her.