How Property Rights Matter to Firm Resource Investment: Evidence from China’s Property Law Enactment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenlong He ◽  
Tony W. Tong ◽  
Mingtao Xu

Although property-rights theory has long been used to explain firms’ ownership of resources, research on the channels through which property rights affect heterogeneous firms’ investment in building resources remains scarce. Leveraging a property-law enactment in China, we find that strengthening property-rights protection leads private firms to make greater intangible and tangible asset investment compared with state-owned firms and that these effects are mediated by external equity and debt financing. Further, we unpack resource heterogeneity by explicating key differences between intangible and tangible assets, and we document an alignment between asset intangibility and financing approaches such that for intangible asset investment, equity plays a larger mediation role, whereas for tangible asset investment, debt’s mediating effect is greater. We contribute to the strategy literature by using property-rights theory to link together asset intangibility and financing approaches and by showing that the strength of property-rights protection affects firms’ resource investment and shapes firm heterogeneity.

Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

This chapter argues for a reinvigorated role of the market access doctrine and references a number of important antitrust and intellectual property law decisions in which courts have given priority to market access. It finds a novel function for market access to play within antitrust and intellectual property law liability: courts that grant plaintiffs access to a defendant’s production output should refer to a three-step test under which they inquire (1) whether the inventor, through first-mover advantages, has reaped a sufficient reward such that contractual or intellectual property rights protection would no longer be required to facilitate innovation, (2) whether competitors were able to challenge the proprietary platform’s position in the market without the possibility of granting access, and (3) whether competitors seeking to benefit from market access will make use of it to facilitate the introduction of new goods rather than merely to copy the initial invention.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tong Chu ◽  
Yu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Wang

Based on the oligopoly game theory and the intellectual property rights protection policy, we investigate the complex dynamical behaviors of a mixed duopoly game with quadratic cost. In the new system, a few parameters are improved by considering intellectual property rights protection and the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium point are discussed in detail. A set of the two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams is demonstrated by using numerical modeling, and these diagrams show abundant complex dynamical behaviors, such as coexistence of attractors, different bifurcation, and fractal structures. These dynamical properties can present the long-run effects of strengthening intellectual property protection.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document