Medical Treatment of the Cardiac Patient Approaching the End of Life

Author(s):  
Lofty L. Basta ◽  
W. Daniel Doty ◽  
Michael D. D. Geldart
Author(s):  
Alan Meisel

This article examines the legal issues surrounding death and dying, emphasizing how clinical practice with respect to end-of-life decisions has been shaped by rights and autonomy. It shows how state and federal court decisions, beginning with the Karen Ann Quinlan case in 1975, led to the emergence of a consensus about the legality of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment. It considers three important court cases in 1972 involving “informed consent” to medical treatment, followed by other cases such as those involving Quinlan in 1975 and Nancy Cruzan in 1990. It then considers two modes of analyzing the propriety of end-of-life decisions that arose mostly from judicial opinions: the “state interests” approach and the “categorical” approach. It also discusses the explanations offered by the courts as to why foregoing life-sustaining medical treatment does not result in legal culpability for physicians, including causation, intent, right to refuse treatment, and palliative care.


2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Seal

The delivery of quality care at the end of life should be seamless across all health care settings and independent from variables such as institutional largeness, charismatic leadership, funding sources and blind luck … People have come to fear the prospect of a technologically protracted death or abandonment with untreated emotional and physical stress. (Field and Castle cited in Fins et al., p. 1–2). 1 Australians are entitled to plan in advance the medical treatments they would allow in the event of incapacity using advance directives (ADs). A critical role of ADs is protecting people from unwanted inappropriate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) at the end stage of life. Generally, ADs are enacted in the context of medical evaluation. However, first responders to a potential cardiac arrest are often non-medical, and in the absence of medical instruction, default CPR applies. That is, unless there is a clear AD CPR refusal on hand and policy supports compliance. Such policy occurs in jurisdictions where statute ADs qualifying or actioning scope is prescriptive enough for organisations to expect all health professionals to appropriately observe them. ADs under common law or similar in nature statute ADs are open to broader clinical translation because the operational criteria are set by the patient. According policy examples require initial medical evaluation to determine their application. Advance care planning (ACP) programs can help bring AD legislation to effect (J. Cashmore, speech at the launch of the Respecting Patient Choices Program at The Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Adelaide, SA, 2004). However, the efficacy of AD CPR refusal depends on the synergy of prevailing AD legislation and ensuing policy. When delivery fails, then democratic AD law is bypassed by paradigms such as the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) community form, as flagged in Australian Resuscitation Council guidelines. 2 Amidst Australian AD review and statute reform this paper offers a perspective on the attributes of a working AD model, drawing on the Respecting Patient Choices Program (RPCP) experience at The Queen Elizabeth Hospital (TQEH) under SA law. The SA Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 and its ‘Anticipatory Direction’ has been foundational to policy enabling non-medical first responders to honour ADs when the patient is at the end stage of life with no real prospect of recovery. 3 The ‘Anticipatory Direction’ provision stands also to direct appointed surrogate decision-makers. It attunes with health discipline ethics codes; does not require a pre-existing medical condition and can be completed independently in the community. Conceivably, the model offers a national AD option, able to deliver AD CPR refusals, as an adjunct to existing common law and statute provisions. This paper only represents the views of the author and it does not constitute legal advice. What is known about the topic?Differences in advance directive (AD) frameworks across Australian states and territories and between legislated and common law can be confusing. 4 Therefore, health professionals need policy clarifying their expected response. Although it is assumed that ADs, including CPR refusals at the end of life will be respected, unless statute legislation is conducive to policy authorising that non-medical first responders to an emergency can observe clear AD CPR refusals, the provision may be ineffectual. Inappropriate, unwanted CPR can render a person indefinitely in a condition they may have previously deemed intolerable. Such intervention also causes distress to staff and families and ties up resources in high demand settings. What does this paper add?That effectual AD law needs to not only enshrine the rights of individuals but that the provision also needs to be deliverable. To be deliverable, statute AD formulation or operational criteria need to be appropriately scoped so that organisations, through policy, are prepared to legally support nurses and ambulance officers in making a medically unsupervised decision to observe clear CPR refusals. This is a critical provision, given ADs in common law (or similar statute) can apply broadly and, in policy examples, require medical authorisation to enact in order to ensure the person’s operational terms are clinically indicated. Moreover, compliance from health professionals (by act or omission) with in-situ ADs in an unavoidable emergency cannot be assumed unless the scope harmonises with ethics codes. This paper identifies a working model of AD delivery in SA under the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 through the Respecting Patient Choices Program. What are the implications for practitioners?A clear, robust AD framework is vital for the appropriate care and peace of mind of those approaching their end of life. A nationally recognised AD option is suggested to avail people, particularly the elderly, of their legal right to grant or refuse consent to CPR at the end of life. ADs should not exclude those without medical conditions from making advance refusals, but in order to ensure appropriate delivery in an emergency response, they need to be scoped so as that they will not be prematurely enacted yet clinically and ethically safe for all health professionals to operationalise. Failure to achieve this may give rise to systems bypassing legislation, such as the American (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) POLST example. It is suggested that the current SA Anticipatory Direction under the Consent to Medical treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 provides a model of legislation producing a framework able to deliver such AD expectations, evidenced by supportive acute and community organisational policies. Definitions.Advance care planning (ACP) is a process whereby a person (ideally ‘in consultation with health care providers, family members and important others’ 5 ), decides on and ‘makes known choices regarding possible future medical treatment and palliative care, in the event that they lose the ability to speak for themselves’ (Office of the Public Advocate, South Australia, see www.opa.sa.gov.au). Advance directives (ADs) in this paper refers to legal documents or informal documents under common law containing individuals’ instructions consent to or refusing future medical treatment in certain circumstances when criteria in the law are met. A legal advance directive may also appoint a surrogate decision-maker.


Author(s):  
Robert C. Macauley

Formerly referred to as “passive euthanasia,” forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment came to be accepted in the 1970s based on a patient’s right to privacy. In order to achieve this societal shift, the practice was clearly distinguished from active euthanasia, which was universally rejected. Over the ensuing decades, other permutations of “the right to die”—including receiving intensive pain medication at the end of life and palliative sedation—were considered and accepted to varying degrees. Modern advocates of euthanasia now argue that it is not, in fact, so different from forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment, which endangers the critical consensus that lies at the heart of the patient rights movement. Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking is also discussed, as well as the ethical equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment.


2010 ◽  
Vol 151 (43) ◽  
pp. 1769-1775
Author(s):  
Gábor Vadász

Az életvégi orvosi döntéseknek csak egyike az eutanázia javallata. E kérdéskörnek a betegágy melletti klinikai történésekkel összefüggő szabatos meghatározása az etikai, a jogi és az orvosi szakirodalomban nem teljes körű. A különböző életvégi események csoportosítására tett kísérlet ez az írás, amelynek célja annak tisztázása, hogy közülük melyek nem sorolhatók a passzív eutanázia fogalomkörébe. Az eutanázia nem jogi kategória. A közkeletűen használt két kifejezés az aktív és a passzív eutanázia, egyszerűsítések, amelyek különböző célú cselekményt takarnak, amelyeknek a szakmai szakszövegekben történő használata zavaró is lehet és félreértésekre adhat okot. Az életvégi terápiás döntéseket a céljukra tekintettel különböztetjük meg. A MOK meghatározásából kiindulva és gyűjtőfogalmat használva, csak az a cselekmény eutanázia, amikor a cselekvésnek vagy nem cselekvésnek célja, kegyelemből, szenvedő embertárs érdekében, életének a megrövidítése vagy kioltása. Ismertetjük az aktív, a passzív és a kényszereutanázia fogalmait. Az indirekt és az intermedier eutanázia fogalmait, mint félremagyarázásokra okot adókat, nem használjuk. Nem tartjuk egyértelmű kizáró oknak az eutanázia fogalomköréből a laikusok segítségét és részvételét a kivitelezésben, és nem tartjuk csak orvoshoz köthető fogalomnak. Ismertetjük azokat az életvégi orvosi döntéseket, amelyeket nem sorolunk a passzív eutanázia fogalomkörébe, ezek: a hasztalanná vált kezelés és életfenntartó eljárások visszavonása, a beteg elengedése, a terápia eszkalációjának ellenjavallata, a palliatív terápia alkalmazása, a szenvedés csillapítását szolgáló kezelés, a kompromisszumos medicina, az újjáélesztés javallatának mérlegelése és a költséghatékony terápia választása. Érintjük az élő végrendelet kérdéskörét, működésképtelenségének okát és viszonyát az aktív és passzív eutanáziához. Az életmentő és életfenntartó kezelés jogi szabályozásának a kérdése kapcsán foglalkozunk az egészségügyi jogalkotástól elvárható szellemiséggel. Orv. Hetil., 2010, 43, 1769–1775.


2020 ◽  
pp. 532-622
Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring

This chapter examines the legal and ethical aspects of death. It begins with a discussion of the difficulty of the choosing a definition of ‘death’. It then sets out the law on a range of ‘end-of-life issues’, including euthanasia, assisted suicide, and refusal of medical treatment. It considers some particularly complex cases in which the law is not always easy to apply. These include the administration of pain-relieving drugs, the treatment of severely disabled newborn children, and the position of patients suffering from PVS. Next, the chapter considers the ethical debates surrounding euthanasia, assisted suicide, and terminating treatment. This is followed by a discussion of palliative care and hospices.


2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura M. Kressel ◽  
Gretchen B. Chapman

2002 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-123
Author(s):  
Ulrich Eibach

Abstract Surveys ofpatients (dialysis, general intemal and oncology patients) show that in crisis situations (especially toward the end of life) decisions about their life are primarily left to physicians and relatives. Only few actually have drawn or wish to draw up a living will, and that the trust in physicians and relatives is rnuch more irnportant to thern than any autonomaus self-deterrnination about their life and the type of their treatrnent. So the author points out that a renaissance of an ethics of care is needed, which places the well-being of the ill and dying at the centre of ethical considerations and which constantly attempts to clarify the proper and good goals at which medical treatment and medical care should aim. Such ethics of care is based on relations of trust between the physician and patient which is not possible to establish without confidence-building talks and acquisition and habitualisation of medical and care virtues such as sympathy, goodwill, recognition of limitations of their own abilities, honesty and others. Just plain specialised information about the diagnosis and prognosis, which leaves the »autonomous enlightened« patients alone with their decision is not a sufficient basis for an ethics of care.


2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 247.1-247
Author(s):  
Ian Jessiman

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