The “Right to Die” (DRAFT)

Author(s):  
Robert C. Macauley

Formerly referred to as “passive euthanasia,” forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment came to be accepted in the 1970s based on a patient’s right to privacy. In order to achieve this societal shift, the practice was clearly distinguished from active euthanasia, which was universally rejected. Over the ensuing decades, other permutations of “the right to die”—including receiving intensive pain medication at the end of life and palliative sedation—were considered and accepted to varying degrees. Modern advocates of euthanasia now argue that it is not, in fact, so different from forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment, which endangers the critical consensus that lies at the heart of the patient rights movement. Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking is also discussed, as well as the ethical equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment.

1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara J. Logue

Hospice is the best-known example of palliative care. Advocates maintain that good palliative care precludes any need for suicide, assisted suicide, or euthanasia for suffering patients near the end of life. This article examines the feasibility of the palliative approach for all patients, showing that reasonable people may refuse even the most exemplary care for themselves or an incompetent relative. Palliative care should always have an important place in medicine. Yet medical realities and the alleviation of pointless suffering necessitate that policymakers consider other options, including “active” euthanasia, consistent with patient autonomy and the right to die.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105-110
Author(s):  
Maryna Kyrsanova

Problem setting. Increasingly, European countries are legalizing euthanasia nationally. At the same time, this issue is a circle for scientific debate, as some experts believe that it is a natural human right that can be disposed of at its discretion. Others emphasize that no one can interrupt a person’s life, even herself. In order to summarize all positions and to determine unanimity on certain aspects of euthanasia, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights, which in art. 2 proclaims the right to life and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has argued for the possibility of a “right to die” as part of the right to life. The purpose. Analysis of the legal position of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the possibility of applying the euthanasia procedure, exploring the prospects of introducing this procedure into the national law. Analysis of recent research and publications. The problem of euthanasia is a matter of debate in the scientific community. This topic was researched by А.В. Malko, AS Nikiforova, O.V Khomchenko, I.O Koval, O.M Mironets, O.A Miroshnichenko, Yu.S. Romashova, K. Basovskaya, Yu.M. Rybakova, O.M Shchokin, S.V Chernichenko. Article’s main body. In science will distinguish 2 types of euthanasia - active and passive. Active euthanasia involves actions aimed at ending the life of a sick person, for example, by administering a lethal injection. Passive euthanasia involves discontinuation of medical care for a patient at his will, which in the future leads to death. Considering the issue of passive euthanasia, the European Commission concluded that it could not be interpreted art. 2 of the Convention as such, which gives the right to death, but everyone has the right to dispose of his life by giving appropriate instructions in the event of an incurable disease.. The issue of the “right to die”, the right to active euthanasia has been resolved in the case of Pritty v. The United Kingdom. The European Court of Human Rights in this case was not convinced that the “right to life” guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention could be interpreted negatively. As for Ukraine, euthanasia in our country is being prosecuted and considered a crime. In particular, according to the Fundamentals of Healthcare Legislation, medical professionals are prohibited from taking deliberate actions aimed at ending the life of a patient who is terminally ill to end his or her suffering. The Civil Code of Ukraine contains a similar warning about the prohibition to deprive a person of his life at his request. Conclusions.The European Court of Human Rights does not consider that the content of art. 2 of the Convention it is possible to derive the “right to die”. This right does not come from the right not life, is not an independent right, can not be a fundamental right, to which all the guarantees of art. 2 of the Convention. With regard to passive euthanasia, the ECtHR does not, in fact, prohibit it; it proceeds from the human right to dispose of one’s life. Speaking about the introduction of the euthanasia procedure in the national legal order, the ECtHR did not give a clear assessment on this issue. In fact, the ECtHR has taken the position that it is not entitled to assess national legislation in terms of introducing effective mechanisms to protect their citizens’ right to life.


2014 ◽  
Vol 155 (27) ◽  
pp. 1057-1062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Máté Julesz

This article deals with the notional distinction between murder of first degree and passive euthanasia. In Hungary, active euthanasia is considered to be a murder of first degree, whilst the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland have legalized the active form of mercy killing in Europe. The palliative terminal medicine, when e.g. giving pain-killer morphin to the patient, might result in shrinking the patient’s life-span, and thus causing indirect euthanasia. However, the legal institution of living will exists in several counter-euthanasia countries. The living will allows future patients to express their decision in advance to refuse a life-sustaining treatment, e.g. in case of irreversible coma. The institution of living will exists in Germany and in Hungary too. Nevertheless, the formal criteria of living will make it hardly applicable. The patient ought to express his/her will before notary in advance, and he/she should hand it over when being hospitalized. If the patient is not able to present his/her living will to his/her doctor in the hospital, then his/her only hope remains that he/she has given a copy of the living will to the family doctor previously, and the family doctor notifies the hospital. Orv. Hetil., 2014, 155(27), 1057–1062.


Nursing Forum ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret A. Marcinek

1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-701 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Cohen-Almagor

This study compares how four countries, the United States, Canada, Britain and Israel, conceive active and passive euthanasia and the right to die in dignity. I start the discussion by clarifying the scope of the analysis and by shedding light on the concepts of autonomy and dignity. Section II proceeds by drawing attention to the familiar distinction between active and passive euthanasia, reviewing the current legal positions in the United States, Canada and England. Section III addresses Ronald Dworkin's distinction between experiential and critical interests, and further contemplates the analogy he draws between the destruction of life and the destruction of masterpieces of art. The section continues by contrasting Dworkin's assertion that what we seek is life in earnest, not any form of life, with Leibowitz's view that human life is sacred. In this context I also refer to the recent Scheffer decision, the only ruling at this time by the Israeli Supreme Court on the issue of death with dignity. Section IV considers the Eyal case, involving an amyotrophic lateral sclerosis patient who expressed his wish not to be connected to a respirator. I assert that in such instances, the patients' autonomy would be sustained and their dignity better served by helping them die. It is not always true that keeping a person alive is to treat her best. In some situations we respect a person and her dignity when we help her cease living. My justification for helping such patients fulfill their request rests on the assumption that they freely and genuinely expressed their will to die, and that they persist in expressing that desire.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (89) ◽  
pp. 415-434
Author(s):  
Jovana Milović

The provision on the right to a dignified death proposed in the Preliminary Draft Civil Code of the Republic of Serbia has again actualized the discussions on the legalization of euthanasia. Within the framework of inheritance legislation, there are discussions regarding the place of euthanasia among the reasons for unworthiness to inherit. In most legislations, euthanasia is still a criminal offense and, on that basis, the reason for unworthiness to inherit. In the legal systems where euthanasia is allowed, this procedure is completely performed by a doctor. Heirs are not involved in the procedure. Accordingly, euthanasia is not mentioned as a reason for unworthiness of the heir to inherit. The legal solution proposed in the Preliminary Draft of the Civil Code of the Republic of Serbia was discussed in general terms and left for further debate. By the time the proposed solution is adopted in this or a slightly modified form, active euthanasia will be the reason for unworthiness to inherit, while passive euthanasia could be discussed within some other legally prescribed reasons for unworthiness.


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