Chapter 7. Can Voter Knowledge Be Increased?

2020 ◽  
pp. 197-223
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 135-155
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

Public reason liberalism is a normative theory meant to adjudicate citizens’ conflicting beliefs about the right and the good. However, it rests upon controversial and likely mistaken empirical claims about voter psychology and voter knowledge. In political science, there are two major paradigms—populism and realism—about the relationship between voters’ beliefs and political outcomes. Realism holds that most citizens lack the kinds of beliefs and attitudes which public reason liberals believe are normatively significant. If so, then most citizens lack the kinds of ideological disputes which public reason liberalism is supposed to adjudicate. Worse, most citizens lack the kinds of normatively significantly beliefs upon which public justification must rest.


2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig M. Burnett ◽  
Lydia Tiede
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Katherine Casey ◽  
Keesler Welch ◽  
Rachel Glennerster

Author(s):  
Katherine Casey ◽  
Keesler Welch ◽  
Rachel Glennerster

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-271
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

Jason Brennan responds to Landemore’s main argument in Debating Democracy. He argues that the proof the Hong–Page Theorem is largely question-begging, and that the concept of “diversity” in the proof does not correspond to the concept as used by democratic theorists. He argues that Landemore must accept that voter knowledge matters, but doing so prevents her from being able to say democracy always outperforms democracy. He also argues that democracy performs as well as it does because it tends to come together with liberalism. He finally offers additional criticisms of open democracy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Logan Dancey ◽  
Geoffrey Sheagley
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Katherine Casey ◽  
Keesler Welch ◽  
Rachel Glennerster

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martijn Schoonvelde

This paper presents an agent-based model (ABM) that shows that variation in voter knowledge can in part be driven by competition among media outlets. Using a set of simple behavioral rules implemented by voters, parties and media outlets, the model predicts that stronger media competition increases political knowledge of quality-minded voters vis-a-vis motivated reasoners although aggregate differences are small. This is because these voters are most likely to consume news even when it is of low quality. Not only do these results contribute to a larger (empirical) debate about media competition and political knowledge, but the model also serves as a theoretical starting point for exploring these patterns further.


Author(s):  
Katherine Casey ◽  
Keesler Welch ◽  
Rachel Glennerster

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