Introduction to Symposium on The Humble Cosmopolitan by Luis Cabrera

This piece introduces a symposium on Luis Cabrera’s The Humble Cosmopolitan (Oxford University Press, 2020), which is a comparative political theory text in three senses. First, it expands conventional conversation partners to include authors who are engaged in constructing their nation out of a colonial context, principally, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar is a scholar, politician, Chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee for the newly independent India, and Dalit activist (“Dalit” being the self-applied term for those outside of the Hindu caste hierarchy) and Madhavrao Sadashivrao Golwalkar, the historical thought leader of Hindu nationalism. Second, Cabrera reaches across the colonized-colonizer divide, engaging with intra-nation difference, enabling cross-time comparisons, broadening the moral and political meanings of, contributions to, and criticisms of cosmopolitan thinking. Third, using grounded normative theory, it is methodologically comparative, utilizing the author’s own empirical research through over 150 interviews of activists and politicians from both Indian and European cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan struggles.

Grounded Normative Theory and Intersectional Differences

This article focuses on the promise of grounded normative theory in Luis Cabrera’s The Humble Cosmopolitan. The article celebrates Cabrera’s use of grounded normative theory as a way to center the lived experience of politically marginalized groups while also being attentive to the politics of knowledge production. My concern is not with the methodology itself; rather, it is with Cabrera’s partial use of it. I ask, how might the analysis of the book change if the author considered different intellectual histories of citizenship rooted in feminist and critical approaches? How might the theoretical assumptions and justifications of the book change if the author challenged his own assumptions, especially as they relate to the epistemic authority of Dalit women?

Digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion: Applying deliberative theories of democracy to political parties

Today’s election campaigns are heavily data-driven. Despite the numerous skeptical voices questioning the compatibility of specific campaigning practices with fundamental principles of liberal democracies, there has to date been little comprehensive work in this area from the perspective of normative democratic theory. Our article addresses this gap by drawing on recent research on the normative theory of political parties in the field of deliberative democratic theory. The deliberative theories of democracy proposed by Habermas and Rawls contain structural elements of a normative theory of the political party: the special status of political parties as mediators between background culture and the political forum, between the political system and the public sphere, and between the individual and the state, confers on them a central position as actors in in the public use of reason and deliberation.We argue in this article for a view of digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion and for the proposition that, alongside other actors, political parties have a special responsibility in this regard. We point to the implications for the evaluation and design of digital political microtargeting that arise from the application of deliberative principles to political parties and consider the need they reveal for the ongoing development of detailed, nuanced normative theories of democracy.

Rorty and Peirce

This chapter presents a fuller, more accurate picture of Rorty’s early appreciation for and indebtedness to Peirce by establishing that Rorty was, by his own lights, at least for a time, a Peircean realist. This distinctive “Peircean” version of realism illuminates Rorty’s mature positions later expressed via a Davidsonian vocabulary. It also recounts how Rorty’s reading of Peirce’s end of inquiry and normative theory of self-controlled conduct enables him to grasp the dependence of epistemology on ethics and to see philosophical discourse as a rule-governed realm that necessitates choice of vocabulary and hence responsibility. Rorty turns out to be more of a realist, as traditionally understood, and Peirce less of one than we might expect. The “ethically-centered epistemology” aimed at the growth of knowledge Rorty sees in Peirce contrasts sharply with the view dominant among contemporary Peirceans, like Misak and Talisse, preoccupied above all with justification.

Cell-type–specific neuromodulation guides synaptic credit assignment in a spiking neural network

Brains learn tasks via experience-driven differential adjustment of their myriad individual synaptic connections, but the mechanisms that target appropriate adjustment to particular connections remain deeply enigmatic. While Hebbian synaptic plasticity, synaptic eligibility traces, and top-down feedback signals surely contribute to solving this synaptic credit-assignment problem, alone, they appear to be insufficient. Inspired by new genetic perspectives on neuronal signaling architectures, here, we present a normative theory for synaptic learning, where we predict that neurons communicate their contribution to the learning outcome to nearby neurons via cell-type–specific local neuromodulation. Computational tests suggest that neuron-type diversity and neuron-type–specific local neuromodulation may be critical pieces of the biological credit-assignment puzzle. They also suggest algorithms for improved artificial neural network learning efficiency.

Enacting Candor

Most citizens of representative democracies do not take political decisions in their everyday lives. Although participation in periodic elections, political parties, or social movements varies, above all, according to socio-economic status, taking a political decision is, in general, a relatively extraordinary event for the vast majority of citizens. The everyday political experience of these citizens is rather structured by watching and listening to political elites. Unlike the tenor of democratic theory, this quotidian mode of passively following politics is ocular democracy’s starting point. So far, the debate on ocular democracy has emphasized its shortcomings as a normative theory. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, this article illustrates the potential of ocular democracy as an analytical tool in the context of intra-party democracy. Podemos’ intra-party procedures are analyzed by complementing an institutional perspective with ocular democracy, thus showing how a party leader inclined to appear particularly venturesome undermines ambitious forms of intra-party democracy.

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

How Can Realism be Utilised in an Understanding of the United States/New Zealand Relationship over Nuclear Policy?

<p>This thesis examines the decision making process of the United States and New Zealand on the nuclear policy issue through the lens of realism and analyses the effect of realism on the ANZUS alliance. Broader questions associated with alliances, national interest, changing priorities and limits on the use of power are also treated. A single case study of the United States/New Zealand security relationship as embodied in the ANZUS treaty will be used to evaluate the utility of realism in understanding the decision making process that led to the declaration by the United States that the treaty was in abeyance. Five significant findings emerged: firstly both New Zealand and the United States used realism in the decision making process based on national interest, Secondly; diverging national interests over the nuclear issue made the ANZUS treaty untenable. Thirdly, ethical and cultural aspects of the relationship between the two states limited the application of classical realism to understanding the bond. Fourthly, normative theory accommodates realist theory on the behaviour of states in the international environment. Finally, continued engagement between the United States and New Zealand and evolved circumstances provided the means to revitalise a changed security relationship.</p>