From Personal Life to Private Law: The Jurisprudence of John Gardner

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Hershovitz
Author(s):  
John Gardner

This introductory chapter clarifies the definitions of ‘personal life’ and ‘private law’ as undertaken by this book. Roughly, ‘personal life’ refers to what people do (as well as what they think, believe, want, etc.) apart from the law. The chapter discusses a ‘monist’ view that what private law would have us do is best understood by reflecting on what we should be doing, quite apart from private law, which entails reflection on the reasons why we should be doing it. As to ‘private law’, this chapter and the book as a whole primarily refer to the law of torts and the law of contract. This definition excludes a few similar but unrelated concepts such as unjust enrichment, breach of trust, and breach of confidence.


Author(s):  
John Gardner

The book examines some of the philosophical foundations of private law, particularly the law of torts and the law of contract, arguing that the law’s problems and solutions are often much the same as those that we encounter in our personal lives, and have much the same rationales. Arguing against the idea that private law operates as an autonomous moral domain, and simultaneously against the idea that it is a tool of welfarist social policy, the book emphasizes the affinity between ideas of duty, responsibility, and reparation in private life and those same ideas in the law. In particular, the book traverses questions about the nature and justification of relational duties, the relevance of an action’s outcome to that action’s appraisal, the case for an agent to be the repairer of his or her own derelictions, the value of apology and other expressions of regret, the importance of restoring what one loses, and the value of opting to make a fresh start. The book is based on the Quain Lectures delivered by the author in 2014, which have been substantially revised and expanded.


Jurisprudence ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-312
Author(s):  
James E Penner
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
J. E Penner

This chapter concerns the justification of property rights, and makes the argument that we do have ‘natural’ or ‘pre-legal’ rights to the use of things, a kind of usufructory right. The Kantian theory of property rights, most thoroughly and convincingly developed by Arthur Ripstein is discussed in detail. Various aspects of the theory are criticized, in particular Kant’s view of right to appropriate unowned things and his famous ‘assurance’ argument. In explaining his differences with the Kantian theory, the author expounds what has been called an ‘instrumentalist’ view of law in general and property law in particular, a view most closely associated with the private law writings of John Gardner.


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