Conclusion

This chapter reflects on how the book’s method of using the Kantian apparatus to build out the moral habitat idea has been an occasion to fundamentally rethink Kantian theory and to show it capable of engaging creatively with contemporary moral concerns. It has also expanded the very idea of a deontology by drawing out the implications of taking imperfect duties seriously and showing the merits of regarding the practical side of moral theory as a kind of participatory moral science. It offers reflections on the local and global implications of the moral habitat idea, the importance to it of innate right, and emphasizes the place of motive and its connection to moral value in the Kantian scheme.

The Personality Nexus

This chapter explores the changing legal landscape of moral rights in the context of music creation. It traces moral rights’ roots to the Kantian theory of authors’ personality rights in continental Europe and it also explains common law jurisdictions’ ideological resistance to a freestanding moral right doctrine in favor of a patchwork approach to the issue. It shows that international agreements including the Berne Convention, the WPPT, and the Beijing Treaty, have played different roles in promoting the minimal moral right standard for either music creators or performers at the international level. Furthermore, it should not be ignored that there has always been an unresolved tension between moral rights and the time-honored practice of music parody, because the former might exert a chilling effect on the latter. It is suggested that a reimagination of moral rights through the Kantian communicative authorship is crucial for accommodating parodic expressions in an increasingly reconfigurable music ecosystem.

Transcendental Conditions, Schematism, and Naturalizing Kant’s “I think”

Considering how Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception could be “naturalized,” this paper seeks to liberate the Kantian theory of experience from any foundationalist renderings that blur the lines between the empirical and transcendental, without compromising Kant’s attempt to investigate how the invariant structures of experience condition and supply rules for our knowledge of the world. This paper begins with an overview of the Transcendental Deduction’s apperceptive “I think.” We then consider Sellars’ Myth of Jones and Sellars’ notion of noumenal reality as a “limit concept” not in metaphysical but alongside pragmatist lines, where the “in-itself” is schematized as a regulatory ideal that normatively orients science as a self-correcting enterprise. Providing a successor-account to Sellars’ naturalization of Kant’s ‘I think,’ we seek to develop hard-transcendental and soft-transcendental pragmatic conditions to describe protocols for revision and integration, proffering an anti-dogmatic metaphysical stance that, true to Kant, expands our understanding of perception and linguistic licensing to include the kind of sensory and conceptual capacities associated with sapient experience.

From Constitutionalism to War—and Back Again

This chapter presents Arthur Ripstein’s responses to the authors of the preceding chapters. The chapter follows the order of the contributions, and are divided broadly into responses to the papers in Part I concerning the ways in which facts matter to right, and the relation between the flawed world in which we find ourselves and the ideal case that Kant contemplates, and to those in Part II dealing with more specific issues in the Kantian theory of war and peace.

Reception and criticism of I. Kant’s theory of space and time in the philosophy of V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov

The subject of this research is the reception of I. Kant's theory of space and time in the theory of cognition of V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov (hereinafter Kudryavtsev). In his theory of cognition, Kudryavtsev not only engages into an indirect dispute with the German philosopher and criticized his point of views, but also used a number of his ideas, namely from the theory of space and time. The relevance of this article is substantiated by the fact that the problem of reception of Kantian ideas in Kudryavtsev's philosophy has not been fully developed. The goal of this research is to determine the specificity of perception of Kantian theory of space and time in the analogous theory of Kudryavtsev. For achieving this goal, the author employed conceptual-analytical, system-structural and comparative methods, as well as the method of historical reconstruction. The scientific novelty lies in elucidation of the nature of reception of gnoseological ideas of I. Kant in the philosophy of V. D. Kudryavtsev. The author outlines the positions of Kantian theory of space and time that were borrowed by Kudryavtsev: 1) space and time have an a priori nature, i.e. they are universal and necessary non-empirical forms of sensory cognition; 2) at the same time, they are conditions of sensory experience. Kudryavtsev also follows Kant in division of reality into phenomena and things-in-themselves, but does not agree with uncognizability of the things-in-themselves. Such divergence is associated with the objective meaning of space and time, which Kudryavtsev insists on, while Kant underlines their subjective meaning alone. In conclusion, it is emphasized that Kudryavtsev formulates his theory of space and time leaning on Kantian apriorism. Kudryavtsev simultaneously agrees with Kant's definitions of space and time and denies Kant's conclusions on their subjective nature.

THE INFLUENCE OF KANTIAN CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BADEN SCHOOL OF NEO-KANTIANISM

В работе выявляется связь, объединяющая кантианскую теорию суждения с эпистемологической доктриной Баденской школы неокантианства. Различение определяющей и рефлектирующей способности суждения сопоставляется с генерализирующим и индивидуализирующим способами образования понятий. Особенности исторического метода возводятся к отличительным чертам телеологического и эстетического вариантов применения рефлектирующего суждения. Выстроенная на этой платформе концепция самостоятельного метода исторического познания задает особое видение исторического познания как опыта восприятия и понимания единичных, однократных и уникальных культурных процессов. The article reveals the connection that unites the Kantian theory of judgment with the epistemological doctrine of the Baden school of neo-Kantianism. The distinction between the determining and reflective ability of judgment is compared with the generalizing and individualizing methods of forming concepts. The features of the historical method are raised to the distinctive features of the teleological and aesthetic variants of the application of reflective judgment. The concept of an independent method of historical cognition, built on this platform, sets a special vision of historical cognition as an experience of perception and understanding of single and unique cultural processes.

MULTITUDES, COLECCIONES E INFINITO: LA EMERGENCIA DEL ENFOQUE CONJUNTISTA EN LA OBRA DE BERNHARD BOLZANO

El artículo tiene por objetivo analizar ciertos pasajes fundamentales de la Wissenschaftslehre y de las Paradoxien des Unendlichen de Bernard Bolzano en cuanto al análisis conjuntista se refiere. En dichos pasajes, Bolzano desarrolla conceptos fundamentales tales como multitud, colección e infinito que anticipan el carácter conjuntista y del análisis matemático moderno. Asimismo, se presentará un breve estudio de las Contribuciones a una más fundada exposición de la matemática y el apéndice, Sobre la teoría kantiana de la construcción de conceptos a través de intuiciones, textos donde Bolzano muestra su rechazo por Kant.The article addresses the treatment of certain fundamental passages from Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre and Paradoxien des Unendlichen. In these passages, Bolzano describes some of his key concepts such “Multitude”, “Collections” and “Infinite” in the context of mathematical analysis and Set theory. Therefore, I discuss at length the (almost) unknown Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics and the appendix On the Kantian Theory of the Construction of Concepts through Intuitions, texts where Bolzano shows his rejection of Kant.