This article looks at whether moral relativism fits within an evolutionary framework. As a metaethical theory, the main ideas of moral relativism include: conventions, moral reasons, moral diversity, and moral disagreement. Two different versions of moral relativism are examined, those developed by Gilbert Harman and by David Wong. Several other writers who have characterized the relationship between moral relativism and an evolutionary perspective are also discussed. In addition, the article examines what three different models of evolution (those of Darwin, Dawkins, and Gould) imply about moral relativism. I argue that Wong’s version of moral relativism, which eschews moral conventionalism, has the best fit with an evolutionary perspective. This may be the case, though, because Wong’s version is quite flexible and leaves us with the lingering question of whether it is really moral relativism.
Moral Relativism and Moral Absolutism: A Comparative study of Gilbert Harman and David B. Wong
