Constraints on the Power to Issue Shares in England and Wales

2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Kasolowsky

Durch das Stimmrecht in der Hauptversammlung üben die Aktionäre ihr Recht aus, über die Geschicke der Gesellschaft mitzuentscheiden. Das englische Gesellschaftsrecht gibt nun einem anderen Organ der Gesellschaft, dem Board of Directors, die Befugnis, das Stimmrecht der Aktionäre und dessen Ausübung zu modifizieren. Gesetz, Richtenecht, Anordnungen der Regulierungsbehörden und Verlautbarungen von Organen der Selbstregulierung versuchen, diese Befugnis der Directors zu beschränken. Derartige Beschränkungen sollen in diesem Aufsatz dargestellt und kommentiert werden. Dabei wird aufgezeigt, daß die „Institutional Investor Guidelines", veifaßt und veröffentlicht von Organisationen der Privatwirtschaft, sachgerecht und effizient unerwünschte Manipulationen der Aktionärsstimmrechte durch die Directors verhindern können, und zwar auch im Vergleich zur staatlichen Regulierung durch Rechtsregeln und Verwaltungsanordnungen. Diese in England gewonnene Erfahrung könnte nützlich sein bei der Implementierung des Zusammenschlusses der Londoner und der Frankfurter Börse.

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1179-1198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eahab Elsaid ◽  
Bradley W. Benson ◽  
Dan L. Worrell

This study seeks to examine if boards consider CEO educational and functional background when choosing a new CEO. It also examines which factors determine whether the board of directors will seek an incoming CEO with a different educational and/or functional background from that of the current CEO. Using a sample of 832 successions between 1992 and 2009, we found that the outgoing CEO characteristics and the firm characteristics influence the selection of the incoming CEO functional backgrounds. We found an increase in the likelihood of firms hiring incoming CEOs with the same functional backgrounds as the outgoing CEOs. Incoming CEOs with functional backgrounds in engineering/manufacturing are more likely to be hired by research-oriented firms.Incoming CEOs with functional backgrounds in accounting/finance are more likely to be hired by poorly performing firms. We also find that firms are more likely to change the functional background of the successor relative to the predecessor when there has been poor prior performance and the firm has higher institutional investor ownership.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Pombo ◽  
Maria Camila De La Hoz

PurposeThis paper examines how the board of directors' attributes in terms of educational and professional backgrounds –that is board capital-, and demographics influence institutional ownership across listed companies in Latin America.Design/methodology/approachBased on unique hand-collected information of directors' educational and professional attributes across 427 firms in Latin America, the authors analyze the effects of directors' educational attainment, professional experience and demographic diversification on institutional investors' holdings.FindingsResults show that grey investor ownership favors directors with graduate studies and diverse boards regarding gender and nationality. Independent investors value the directors' professional experience like former founders of a firm. Grey investors are more concerned with firm corporate governance mechanisms, consistent with the agency view. In contrast, independent institutional investors focus on business opportunities following the board of directors' resource-based view.Research limitations/implicationsThis study shows that board capital becomes a key determinant for institutional ownership in emerging markets.Originality/valueThis study extends previous literature on institutional investor preferences by providing empirical evidence that firm board capital becomes a collective asset that is central for institutional investors' investment choices for an emerging market case.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document