scholarly journals Comentário a “A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the Reflective Epistemic Agency”

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-456
Author(s):  
Gregory Gaboardi
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran Setiya
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Joan Moss ◽  
Ruth Beatty

Three classrooms of Grade 4 students from different schools and diverse backgrounds collaborated in early algebra research to solve a series of linear and quadratic generalizing problems. Results revealed that high- and low-achieving students were able to solve problems of recognized difficulty. We discuss Knowledge Building principles and practices that fostered deep understanding and broad participation. Students used the online Knowledge Building environment Knowledge Forum® to conduct their work and we illustrate how Knowledge Forum supported a Knowledge Building culture for mathematical learning and problem solving. Analyses of participation patterns and note content revealed practices consistent with Knowledge Building principles, specifically democratization of knowledge, with students at all achievement levels participating, and epistemic agency, with students providing evidence and justification for conjectures and generating multiple solutions to challenging problems.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Anaya

AbstractIt is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a result it can be met luckily. I shall argue that this kind of luck is inconsistent with knowledge. In order to prevent this pernicious form of luck I introduce a “defeaters-responsiveness” condition, according to which subjects ought to be disposed to adequately address defeaters if they were to arise (even if they in fact do not arise).


Author(s):  
Ege Selin Islekel

This chapter develops a conception of necropolitics as a power/knowledge assemblage by focusing on the games of truth and regimes of knowledge produced around death in the cases of mass graves and disappearance in Turkey. In particular, I am interested in the relations drawn between death, memory, and knowledge in necropolitical spaces, in spaces where life and the living are subsumed under the active production, regulation, and optimisation of death. The chapter consists of three parts: the first part analyses the relation between necropolitics and knowledge production, in order to establish necropolitics not only as a political technology, but also an epistemic one. The second section investigates the specific techniques of knowledge deployed in necropolitics, i.e., necro-epistemic methods, which target the temporal and logical coherence of memory in necropolitical spaces. The last section focuses on the practices of epistemic resistance, which work through mobilising perplexing realities in order to instigate counter-discourses. Overall, I argue that these counter-discourses, which I call ‘nightmare-knowledges,’ constitute necropolitical spaces as spaces of epistemic agency.


2021 ◽  
pp. 340-351
Author(s):  
Hanne Jacobs
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini

This chapter sets out the philosophical foundations of the proposed account of virtues and vices of intellectual self-appraisal. It explains the nature of intellectual vices in general by distinguishing between sensibilities, thinking styles, and character traits. Subsequently, it describes the specific features of the epistemic vices of self-appraisal. The chapter supplies an account of what makes epistemic vices vicious, and argues in favour of a motivational view. In the author’s view the vices of intellectual self-appraisal are impairments of epistemic agency caused by motivations, such as those of self-enhancement or impression management, that also bring other epistemically bad motives in their trail. Such motivations bias epistemic evaluations of one’s cognitive abilities, processes, and states. These appraisals, in turn, have widespread negative influences on agents’ epistemic conduct as a whole.


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