Intellectual Virtues and Vices

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-47
Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini
Keyword(s):  
Impression Management ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Philosophical Foundations

This chapter sets out the philosophical foundations of the proposed account of virtues and vices of intellectual self-appraisal. It explains the nature of intellectual vices in general by distinguishing between sensibilities, thinking styles, and character traits. Subsequently, it describes the specific features of the epistemic vices of self-appraisal. The chapter supplies an account of what makes epistemic vices vicious, and argues in favour of a motivational view. In the author’s view the vices of intellectual self-appraisal are impairments of epistemic agency caused by motivations, such as those of self-enhancement or impression management, that also bring other epistemically bad motives in their trail. Such motivations bias epistemic evaluations of one’s cognitive abilities, processes, and states. These appraisals, in turn, have widespread negative influences on agents’ epistemic conduct as a whole.

Attitude Psychology and Virtue Epistemology

2021 ◽  
pp. 48-70
Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Psychological Constructs ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Cognitive Dimensions

Virtue ethicists and epistemologists have generally presumed that virtue and vices are real psychological states or traits amenable to empirical study. There is, however, no agreement on the psychological constructs that may play this role. This chapter introduces the apparatus of attitude psychology that, in the author’s view, supplies a theoretical framework suitable to understand those intellectual vices which in Chapter 2 have been described as defects in epistemic agency. The approach throws light on the affective, motivational, and cognitive dimensions of the vices which are under scrutiny in this book. The chapter provides an overview of key concepts in attitude psychology including that of an attitude as a summary evaluation of its object. It makes a case that attitudes are the causal bases of intellectual virtues and vices. It concludes by addressing various objections to the framework and briefly addresses the questions raised by the situationist criticism of virtue epistemology.

scholarly journals The Validity of the PICTS-SV and Its Effectiveness with Positive Impression Management: An Investigation in a Court-Mandated Substance Use Treatment Facility

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-98
Author(s):  
Margot M. Williams ◽  
Richard Rogers ◽  
Sara E. Hartigan
Keyword(s):  
Substance Use ◽  
Impression Management ◽  
Reading Level ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Substance Use Treatment ◽  
Risk Minimization ◽  
Criminal Thinking ◽  
Treatment Facility ◽  
Historical Factors ◽  
Court Mandated

Forensic practitioners are regularly called on to conduct highly consequential evaluations of risk for recidivism and violence. Accordingly, numerous specialized risk assessment measures have been developed to evaluate an array of relevant variables. As one conceptual approach, the Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS) assesses criminal thinking as a dynamic criminogenic need with predictive validity beyond historical factors. Because of its high reading level, however, a simplified version (PICTS-SV) was recently developed. The current investigation sought to (a) examine the two versions’ direct concurrence and (b) test the PICTS-SV’s vulnerability to risk minimization (RM). Two separate studies recruited 150 participants from a court-mandated substance use treatment facility. Study 1 established the PICTS-SV’s concurrent validity with the PICTS, especially at the composite level. Study 2 observed its robust resistance to RM distortion, although some validity scale revisions appear warranted. Overall, these results support the PICTS-SV’s utility for informing effective interventions and accurate risk determinations.

Virtue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Baehr
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
Transmission Of Knowledge

Intellectual virtues are character traits that facilitate the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods. This chapter takes up the question of which traits are intellectual virtues in relation to a particular variety of knowledge; namely, knowledge of God. It is argued that moral humility (as distinct from intellectual humility) is an intellectual virtue in this context. This account of moral humility and its epistemically salutary effects is sketched against the backdrop of an account of human pride and the obstacles such pride poses to the acquisition of theistic knowledge. Finally, an objection is considered according to which, owing to other features of human psychology, moral humility may in fact be an intellectual vice in this context.

Intellectual virtue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Battaly
Keyword(s):  
Role Models ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Bird Species ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Virtue Reliabilism ◽  
Open Question

Intellectual virtues are qualities that make one an excellent thinker. The contemporary literature offers two different analyses of intellectual virtues: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilism argues that intellectual virtues are stable dispositions that reliably produce true beliefs. For reliabilists, any stable reliable disposition will do. Hard-wired faculties like reliable vision, acquired skills like the ability to identify bird species, and acquired character traits like open-mindedness all count as intellectual virtues. In contrast, responsibilists restrict intellectual virtues to acquired character traits, like open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courage, over which the agent has some control and for which she is to some degree responsible. What can these analyses of intellectual virtue do for us? Reliabilists and responsibilists have used their respective analyses of intellectual virtue to ground new accounts of knowledge. Though the details of their accounts differ, both camps define knowledge in terms of intellectual virtues. They take intellectual virtues, which are evaluations of agents, to be more theoretically fundamental than knowledge and justification, which are evaluations of beliefs. It is an open question as to whether their accounts of knowledge succeed. But even if they fail, their virtue theoretic approach to knowledge has already had a significant impact on analytic epistemology – it has put active knowledge back on the map. Responsibilists have also begun to apply their analysis of intellectual virtue to classroom education and curricula. They argue that virtues like intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, and open-mindedness are developed over time, via practice and the imitation of role models. There are several educational projects underway that aim to facilitate the development of these virtues in students.

Critical Thinking and the Intellectual Virtues

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Habits Of Mind ◽  
Intellectual Virtues

In this chapter I address four (clusters of) questions: (1) Are the dispositions, habits of mind, and character traits constitutive of the “critical spirit” rightly conceived as intellectual virtues? What is gained and/or lost by so conceiving them? (2) Do the intellectual virtues include abilities as well as dispositions, or should we maintain the distinction, embraced by many accounts of critical thinking, between abilities of reason assessment and the critical spirit? (3) Should we be externalists/reliabilists or responsibilists with respect to the intellectual virtues? (4) What is the connection between virtue and reason? Is a virtuous intellect eo ipso a rational one? I will argue that a virtuous intellect is not necessarily a rational one, and that in addition to the intellectual virtues, rational abilities—those captured by the reason assessment component of critical thinking—are required.

The Mismeasure of the Self

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
The Self ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Self Evaluation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Psychological Features

The aim of this book is to offer detailed characterizations of some intellectual virtues and vices of self-evaluation, to highlight the epistemic harms and moral wrongs that flow from them, to explain their psychological bases and to suggest that some interventions that inhibit vicious behaviour and promote intellectual virtue. The first chapter introduces the virtues and vices of intellectual self-evaluation that are the main topic of the book. The second chapter offers a detailed account of three kinds of intellectual vices: character traits, thinking styles, and sensibilities. The chapter includes a defence of the view that motivations play a crucial role in the development and preservation of these psychological features. The third chapter introduces attitude psychology which supplies the framework for detailed accounts of virtue and vices. These accounts are provided in Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 discusses humility, pride, and concern for one’s intellectual reputation. Chapter 5 details superbia, arrogance, servility, and self-abasement. Chapter 6 is dedicated to vanity, narcissism, timidity, and fatalism. Chapter 7 analyses the epistemic harms and moral wrongs that flow from these intellectual vices. Chapter 8 argues individuals are morally and epistemically responsible for their epistemic vices and the bad believing that flows from them, but raises questions about the wisdom and morality of blaming people for these psychological features. Finally, Chapter 9 evaluates some interventions designed to promote virtue and reduce vice.

scholarly journals The Reflective Mind: Examining Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Base Rate Neglect with fMRI

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1011-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oshin Vartanian ◽  
Erin L. Beatty ◽  
Ingrid Smith ◽  
Kristen Blackler ◽  
Quan Lam ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Reflective Thinking ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Posterior Cingulate Cortex ◽  
Thinking Styles ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Base Rate Neglect ◽  
Behavioral Dissociation

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.

Intellectual Humility, Proper Pride, and Proper Concern with Others’ Esteem

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-95
Author(s):  
Alessandra Tanesini
Keyword(s):  
Social Comparisons ◽  
The Other ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Overlapping Clusters ◽  
The One ◽  
Intellectual Limitations

This chapter provides accounts of four character traits: intellectual modesty and acceptance of intellectual limitations (which together constitute intellectual humility); proper pride in one’s epistemic achievements and proper concern for one’s intellectual reputation. It argues that these are intellectual virtues. The main difference between humility (as comprising of modesty and of acceptance of limitations) on the one hand, and pride and concern for esteem on the other, lies in the nature of social comparisons on which they are based. Humility relies on appraisals of the worth of one’s qualities that might be gauged by comparing oneself to other people and which are driven by a concern for accuracy. The chapter also makes a case that overlapping clusters of attitudes serving knowledge and value expressive functions are the causal bases of these character traits.

Virtue Responsibilism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Wright
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
General Objection ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism ◽  
Number Of Authors

This chapter begins by marking the distinction between reliabilism and responsibilism in virtue epistemology. It then charts the development of virtue responsibilism through a number of authors, noting the subtle distinctions in their views. Varieties of virtue responsibilism are distinguished first, by their characterization of the intellectual virtues, and second, by the role (if any) they assign to the intellectual virtues in defining knowledge. A number of arguments against defining knowledge with reference to the intellectual virtues are surveyed. Situationism is then presented as a general objection to the very existence of either moral or intellectual virtues. It is argued that the empirical studies taken to support situationism do not demonstrate the lack of virtuous character traits when those traits are properly understood. Finally, there is a survey of the host of directions in which current approaches to virtue responsibilism are developing.

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