scholarly journals Federal Interference with State and Tribal Sports Betting Regulations Will Not Work: Where the Sports Wagering Integrity Act of 2018 Went Wrong and How Federal Legislation Might Be Effective

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-141
Author(s):  
Becky Harris

On Monday, May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States struck a fatal blow to the federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) when it determined PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Prior to the PASPA repeal, Nevada had been the only state in the United States (US) authorized to offer a full complement of legal sports betting options. Because, Nevada’s race books and sports pools have had the ability to offer wagers on sports since 1947, those legal sports betting operations were “grandfathered” into PASPA when it was passed by Congress in 1992. Having anticipated repeal as a possible outcome, four states passed laws making sports betting legal in case the Supreme Court ruled in New Jersey’s favor, and one state pre-emptively legalized sports betting through a ballot measure. With barriers removed by the PASPA repeal, state gambling regulators were able to grant licenses and adopt regulations. State legislatures were also able legalize sports wagering during their upcoming legislative sessions. And they did!

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-90
Author(s):  
Rose Cecile Chan

Plaintiffs, Sperry Corp. and Sperry World Trade Inc. (Sperry), received an award from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal). Upon payment of the award, the United States deducted 2 percent of the total amount pursuant to a directive license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury regarding recovered claims by U.S. nationals against Iran. When plaintiffs challenged the authority of the Treasury to make the deduction and the United States Claims Court announced a preliminary ruling that concurred with plaintiffs’ position, the Executive persuaded Congress to approve legislation authorizing specified percentages to be deducted by the United States from Tribunal awards to U.S. citizens. Responding to the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the newly enacted statute, the United States Claims Court dismissed the suit and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (per Meyer, J.) reversed and held: that the deduction constitutes a taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In September 1988, the United States filed notice of appeal with the Supreme Court.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
Mark Berger

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The Boyd decision in 1886 recognised an intimate relation between the privilege against self-incrimination and the restrictions on search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment and created a virtually impenetrable barrier to government demands that a suspect or defendant be compelled to produce evidence against himself. However, since that time the Supreme Court has progressively restricted the scope of Fifth Amendment protection in relation to the compelled production of evidence. This has been achieved by requiring all citizens to appear before grand juries; by denying Fifth Amendment protection to entities; by holding that the compelled production of evidence does not breach the Fifth Amendment unless the very act of production is self-incriminatory; and by denying the privilege in relation to required records. The Supreme Court's stance reflects a recognition of the complexity of contemporary law enforcement problems and may be seen as an attempt to balance the state's interest in the successful prosecution of crime against the citizen's interest in being free from state intrusion. The effect of the Supreme Court's reforms has been to broaden government authority to compel offenders to assist in their own prosecutions whilst limiting Fifth Amendment protection to incrimination through the accused's own testimony or its equivalent.


Author(s):  
David S. Schwartz

McCulloch v. Maryland and its principles came under attack during the Jacksonian era, and the Supreme Court under John Marshall’s successor, Roger Taney, ignored McCulloch into oblivion and reversed its thrust. The Taney Court prioritized states’ rights over federal power, to protect the constitutional position of slavery. McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden had refrained from committing the Court to implied commerce powers, and Gibbons also invited the Taney Court to ignore McCulloch. To the Jacksonian justices of the Taney Court, preservation of slave-state sovereignty—not the power of Congress to act for the benefit of the whole people—was the bedrock principle of the Constitution. Reserved state powers under the Tenth Amendment were sufficient to block implied federal powers. Moreover, states could regulate matters expressly delegated to the United States when conducive to exercising their reserved powers.


Author(s):  
Maryam Ahranjani

The very first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of speech. While the Supreme Court held in 1969 that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,” since then the Court has limited students' freedom of speech, stopping short of considering the boundaries of off-campus, online speech. Lower court holdings vary, meaning that a student engaging in certain online speech may not be punished at all in one state but would face harsh criminal punishments in another. The lack of a uniform standard leads to dangerously inconsistent punishments and poses the ultimate threat to constitutional knowledge and citizenship exercise: chilling of speech. Recent interest in technology-related cases and the presence of a new justice may reverse the Court's prior unwillingness to address this issue. In the meantime, this chapter argues that school districts should erect a virtual schoolhouse gate by implementing a uniform standard.


Numen ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-212
Author(s):  
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan

AbstractThe meaning and application of the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are currently a matter of intense and increasingly intractable public debate. The academic study of religion can make a positive contribution to this debate by inviting its participants into a conversation about human religion that is already struggling with problems of definition and of language and that wishes to affirm the existence and importance of human religion without establishing a particular definition of religion, without unconsciously theologizing. A close examination of the legal debate can, in turn, serve the purposes of scholars of religion. The politically charged context of First Amendment jurisprudence provides an interesting laboratory in which to test theories of religion.


Federalism-E ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-56
Author(s):  
Lucy Ackerman

This paper argues that the Tenth Amendment was a beneficial compromise between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, and as a result the Amendment is not a truism, but instead integral to securing state sovereignty and protecting the integrity of federalism.  The paper begins by describing the historical context for the inclusion of the Amendment and the framers’ reasoning for its inclusion. The paper continues on to evaluate the Amendment from its conception until present day. The paper refutes the Amendment as a truism, displaying how the Supreme Court has significantly developed the relevance and use of the Amendment through two major time periods: the interwar period and the years following the Supreme Court case Schechter Corp. v. United States. A variety of Supreme Court cases, peer reviewed articles, and recently published news articles are employed to illustrate the Amendment’s development and relevance to federalism in the United States.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 925-940 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert K. Faulkner

Alexander Bickel's three most comprehensive books explore a common constitutional-political theme, the manner in which sound political judgment should guide judges and scholars who authoritatively interpret the United States Constitution. Yet the works differ, and the differences illuminate a dual development of Bickel's understanding: a growing fear of the contemporary obstacles to politic constitutional judgment, and a growing thoughtfulness in coming to grips with these obstacles. The Least Dangerous Branch had invented politic techniques for applying the judiciary's principles. The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress cautioned against judicial application, by novel techniques, of an impolitic egalitarian faith. The Morality of Consent, upon which this paper concentrates, elaborates Bickel's turn from the techniques of judicial power to the wise direction of judicial power. The paper considers the direction that Bickel proposes.


1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

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