Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficient Liability Rules

The Structure of Efficient Liability Rules

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1844577 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Satish K. Jain

Keyword(s):

Liability Rules ◽

Efficient Liability Rules

The Structure of Efficient Liability Rules

Economic Analysis of Liability Rules ◽

10.1007/978-81-322-2029-9_3 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 35-62

Author(s):

Satish Kumar Jain

Keyword(s):

Liability Rules ◽

Efficient Liability Rules

Toward Development of Efficient Liability Rules

The Crisis in Telecommunications Carrier Liability ◽

10.1007/978-1-4615-4993-2_7 ◽

1999 ◽

pp. 97-117

Author(s):

Barbara A. Cherry

Keyword(s):

Liability Rules ◽

Efficient Liability Rules

Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals

Journal of Public Economics ◽

10.1016/0047-2727(90)90045-j ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 42 (1) ◽

pp. 89-104 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Winand Emons

Keyword(s):

Liability Rules ◽

Efficient Liability Rules

A Complete Characterization of Efficient Liability Rules: Comment

Journal of Economics ◽

10.1007/s00712-003-0013-2 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 81 (1) ◽

pp. 61-75 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Jeonghyun Kim

Keyword(s):

Complete Characterization ◽

Liability Rules ◽

Efficient Liability Rules

Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization

Journal of Economics ◽

10.1007/s007120200008 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 75 (2) ◽

pp. 105-124 ◽

Cited By ~ 32

Author(s):

Satish K. Jain ◽

Ram Singh

Keyword(s):

Complete Characterization ◽

Liability Rules ◽

Efficient Liability Rules

Algorithmic Governance and Technological Guidance of Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Use: Regulatory Policies, Traffic Liability Rules, and Ethical Dilemmas

Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice ◽

10.22381/crlsj11220192 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (2) ◽

pp. 15 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

Ethical Dilemmas ◽

Autonomous Vehicle ◽

Liability Rules ◽

Regulatory Policies

Economic Analysis of Accident Law: A New Liability Rule that Induces Socially Optimal Behaviour in Case of Limited Information

Review of Law & Economics ◽

10.1515/rle-2019-0049 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 0 (0) ◽

Author(s):

Astha Srivastava ◽

Ankur Srivastava

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Economic Analysis ◽

Standard Of Care ◽

Limited Information ◽

Liability Rule ◽

Rule Based ◽

Liability Rules ◽

Levels Of Care ◽

Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽

Optimal Behaviour

AbstractIn accident law, we seek a liability rule that will induce both the parties to adopt socially optimal levels of precaution. Economic analysis, however, shows that none of the commonly used liability rules induce both parties to adopt optimal levels, if courts have access only to ‘Limited Information’ on. In such a case, it has also been established (K. (2006). Efficiency of liability rules: a reconsideration. J. Int. Trade Econ. Dev. 15: 359–373) that no liability rule based on cost justified untaken precaution as a standard of care can be efficient. In this paper, we describe a two-step liability rule: the rule of negligence with the defence of relative negligence. We prove that this rule has a unique Nash equilibrium at socially optimal levels of care for the non-cooperative game, and therefore induces both parties to adopt socially optimal behaviour even in case of limited information.

Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again

Review of Law & Economics ◽

10.2202/1555-5879.1073 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 2 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Keith N Hylton

Keyword(s):

Liability Rules

Private property, public access and occupiers’ liability

Legal Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1748-121x.1995.tb00524.x ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 15 (3) ◽

pp. 335-355

Author(s):

FR Barker ◽

NDM Parry

Keyword(s):

Legal System ◽

Private Property ◽

Good Deal ◽

Public Access ◽

The Other ◽

Legal Responsibility ◽

Policy Preference ◽

Duty Of Care ◽

Liability Rules ◽

Legal Rules

There is nothing new about legal rules which provide that a person who is in control of land owes a duty of care to entrants thereto. These occupiers’ liability rules are often seen as something primarily to do with tort, but their content and substance are also likely to reveal a good deal about the ‘property policy’ of the legal system in question, in the sense that they will indicate the respective weight and importance attachkd to various kinds of competing claim over land. A legal system containing rules that restrict the circumstances in which those with individual, controlling claims over land owe a duty of care to other persons entering that land would appear to indicate a policy preference for supporting and protecting ‘private property’ claims to land above others. On the other hand, a system which imposes on those controlling land a greater degree of legal responsibility for persons entering thereon may be one based on a policy of recognising, protecting and supporting a range of claims in land beyond those of a narrow, private nature.