Recent Developments to Promote Transparency and Public Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration

Author(s):  
James Harrison
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Collins ◽  
Philip Thomas ◽  
Mark Broom ◽  
Trung Hieu Vu

Author(s):  
Farouk El-Hosseny ◽  
Patrick Devine

Abstract The intersection between foreign investment and human rights is gaining attention, as is evident from an increasing number of investment treaty awards analysing legal issues relating to human rights. In the recent International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration of Bear Creek v Peru, Philippe Sands QC posited, in a dissenting opinion, that the investor’s contribution to events—ie protests against its allegedly adverse environmental impact and disregard of indigenous rights, namely resulting from its ‘inability to obtain a “social licence”’—which led to the unlawful expropriation of its investment, was ‘significant and material’. He further noted that the investor’s ‘responsibilities are no less than those of the government’ and found that damages should thus be reduced. Last year, the Netherlands adopted a new model bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which allows tribunals to ‘take into account non-compliance by the investor with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ when assessing damages. These recent developments shed light on how states and tribunals, as part of their decision-making process, can take into account human rights in practice, and crucially in respect of damages analyses. By first dissecting the concept of contributory fault, then shedding light on the intersection of investment treaty law and human rights, as elucidated in recent jurisprudence, this article questions whether there now exists a gateway for human rights obligations (soft or hard) in the investment treaty arbitration realm through the concept of contributory fault.


Author(s):  
Alexander J Marcopoulos

Abstract Although they are generally not subject to appeal the way court decisions typically are, investor-State arbitration awards can be reviewed—and potentially set aside—in a number of ways and on various bases. In this respect, investor-State arbitration under the auspices of ICSID is notable in that it provides a self-contained system for the review of arbitral awards by ICSID-appointed ad hoc committees. In the period 2000–2010, this feature of the ICSID system attracted criticism as ad hoc committees appeared to be overreaching in their review of arbitral awards, exercising less deference to the tribunal’s decisions than what would be expected given the narrow bases for setting aside an award under the ICSID Convention. This article revisits the issue 10 years later, exploring whether ICSID practice has evolved in these areas and whether there remains a greater risk of unexpected de novo review by ICSID ad hoc committees. Looking at recent ICSID annulment decisions as well as the case law of arbitration-friendly jurisdictions, the article concludes that although the ICSID ad hoc committees have recently shown more restraint, they continue to interfere more with the tribunal’s reasoning and decisions than many courts exercising the same function.


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