Solution Concepts for Games with General Coalition Structure

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gleb A. Koshevoy ◽  
Dolf J. J. Talman
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douae Ahmadoun ◽  
Elise Bonzon ◽  
Cedric Buron ◽  
Pavlos Moraitis ◽  
Pierre Saveant ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.


Author(s):  
Tenda Okimoto ◽  
Nicolas Schwind ◽  
Emir Demirović ◽  
Katsumi Inoue ◽  
Pierre Marquis

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