The Adverse Selection Approach to Financial Intermediation: Some Characteristics of the Equilibrium Financial Structure

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Weinberg
1986 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 501-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASAKO N. DARROUGH ◽  
NEAL M. STOUGHTON

1977 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Brealey ◽  
Hayne E. Leland ◽  
David H. Pyle

Author(s):  
John Goddard ◽  
John O. S. Wilson

The term financial intermediation refers to the traditional banking business model, under which a bank accepts deposits from savers and lends funds to borrowers. The accumulation of bank deposits and the growth of bank lending are inextricably linked. ‘Financial intermediation’ explains the functions of maturity transformation, size transformation, and diversification. It goes on to outline adverse selection, moral hazard, leverage, and the magnification of return and risk. By acting as a financial intermediary, a bank takes on several types of risk, the two most fundamental types being credit risk and liquidity risk. Other sources of risk in financial intermediation include market risk, operational risk, settlement risk, currency risk, and sovereign risk.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 686-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clémence Alasseur ◽  
Ivar Ekeland ◽  
Romuald Élie ◽  
Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez ◽  
Dylan Possamaï

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lutz G. Arnold

Abstract Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under twosided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.


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