Legal Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Some Lessons from the Ongoing International Debates Regarding Resale Price Maintenance

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Jacobs
2004 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-720
Author(s):  
José-Ignacio Martínez Ruiz

Unlike U.S. and British steel firms, Spanish steel manufacturers did not integrate their operations with wholesalers and retailers or distribute their output through the market. Instead, from 1928 onward, Spanish steel firms imposed various forms of vertical restraints on wholesalers, including exclusive dealing, stock quotas, and resale price maintenance. These restrictions prevented the iron and steel wholesalers, who banded together to form a cartel in 1910, from establishing their own pricing policies. In addition, the restrictions limited competition in the industry. After 1928, when the independent steel firms found it impossible to distribute their products through the main iron wholesalers, they had no choice but to join the Spanish steel cartel.


Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

This chapter analyzes existing U.S. Supreme Court case law with respect to, on the one hand, antitrust’s minimum resale price maintenance plans, bundling and tying practices, as well as refusals to deal, and, on the other hand, trademark law’s dilution, postsale, sponsorship, and initial interest confusion doctrines, including design patent and selected areas of copyright law. It demonstrates that courts, based on the free riding hypothesis, have come to protect increasing amounts of artificial shortage of everyday consumer goods and services and corresponding incentives to innovate. Through the preservation of such values, antitrust and intellectual property laws have evolved into “dilution laws” and have focused, almost exclusively, on the refurbishment of the technological supply side of our present-day digital economies rather than also on the human demand side of “creative consumption.”


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