scholarly journals A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hengjie Ai ◽  
Dana Kiku ◽  
Rui Li
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Design Model ◽  
Limited Commitment

An Online Bandwidth Allocation Scheme Based on Mechanism Design Model

2013 ◽  
Vol E96.B (1) ◽  
pp. 321-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sungwook KIM
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Bandwidth Allocation ◽  
Design Model ◽  
Allocation Scheme

A Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 317-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENGJIE AI ◽  
DANA KIKU ◽  
RUI LI ◽  
JINCHENG TONG
Keyword(s):  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Unified Model ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Assortative Matching

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Balseiro ◽  
Omar Besbes ◽  
Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design

scholarly journals Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1655-1714
Author(s):  
Ran Eilat ◽  
Ady Pauzner
Keyword(s):  
Objective Function ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Gains From Trade ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations ◽  
Available Information

We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative to conventional mechanisms. We analyze this limited commitment environment as a standard mechanism design problem with an additional “credibility” constraint, requiring that every outcome be interim‐optimal conditional on available information. We investigate how such intermediaries communicate with the parties, analyze the tradeoffs they face, and study the bounds on what they can achieve.

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 711-730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago R. Balseiro ◽  
Omar Besbes ◽  
Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design

scholarly journals Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Doval ◽  
Vasiliki Skreta
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Limited Commitment

Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model

2006 ◽  
Vol 52 (11) ◽  
pp. 1647-1660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuanming Su ◽  
Stefanos A. Zenios
Keyword(s):  
Kidney Transplantation ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Model ◽  
Trade Off

Study on the Parameter Calibration of Interactive Highway Safety Design Model Based on China Interchange Accident Prediction Model

CICTP 2020 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aosiman Yilixiati ◽  
Xiaowei Ren ◽  
Shaoxiang Yang ◽  
Tao Hu ◽  
Delong Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Model ◽  
Highway Safety ◽  
Design Model ◽  
Parameter Calibration ◽  
Accident Prediction ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Safety Design
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