Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Balseiro ◽  
Omar Besbes ◽  
Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 711-730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago R. Balseiro ◽  
Omar Besbes ◽  
Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design

Shifting Supports in Dynamic Mechanism Design

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Liu ◽  
Dongri Liu ◽  
Jingfeng Lu
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design

scholarly journals Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions

2006 ◽  
Vol 126 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Doepke ◽  
Robert M. Townsend
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽  
Hidden Actions

scholarly journals Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Juuso Välimäki
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Environment ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanisms ◽  
Sequential Screening ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Primary Focus

We provide an introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design, with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well-known Vickrey– Clark–Groves and D’Aspremont–Gérard–Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss revenue optimal mechanisms. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue-maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agents’ types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents and limited liability, we conclude with a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design. ( JEL D44, D81, D82)

scholarly journals Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Swaprava Nath ◽  
Onno Zoeter ◽  
Y. Narahari ◽  
Christopher R. Dance
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽  
Interdependent Valuations

scholarly journals Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Harrison ◽  
Roger Lagunoff
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽  
Global Commons
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