'Creeping' Advisory Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals? The Troublesome Case of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Ruys ◽  
Anemoon Soete
Keyword(s):  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
International Tribunal ◽  
International Courts ◽  
The Law

The Application of Teachings by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-46
Author(s):  
Sondre Torp Helmersen
Keyword(s):  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
International Tribunal ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Low Weight ◽  
General Weight ◽  
The Law

Abstract Scholars have examined the role of ‘teachings’ (or ‘literature’, ‘doctrine’ or ‘scholarship’) in various international courts and tribunals, but never the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This article analyses the general weight ITLOS judges assign to teachings, how the judges distinguish between more and less significant teachings, and how and why different judges use teachings differently. ITLOS judges generally seem to assign teachings low weight, albeit with some exceptions. Some teachings are seen as more important, on the basis of their quality and on the fact that multiple writers agree. Judges treat teachings somewhat differently, with Judge Laing being a significant outlier, responsible for roughly half of all citations.

‘Creeping’ Advisory Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals? The case of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOM RUYS ◽  
ANEMOON SOETE
Keyword(s):  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
International Tribunal ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
The Law ◽  
Unregulated Fishing

AbstractOn 2 April 2015, the full International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rendered its first advisory opinion in reply to a request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission regarding illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Unlike any other court or tribunal with advisory competence, including the Seabed Disputes Chamber, ITLOS’ advisory jurisdiction is not explicitly enshrined in its constituent instrument, but was rather asserted in the Tribunal’s, homemade, rules of procedure. In spite of strong objections from various states, ITLOS affirmed a broad advisory jurisdiction ratione materiae and personae, and found that there were no compelling reasons to exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the request. The request and the Tribunal's handling thereof raise interesting questions regarding the opportunities and risks inherent to, and the outer limits of, the advisory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. This contribution takes a look at the advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal, having regard to the experiences of other international courts and tribunals.

Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean, Preliminary Objections (ITLOS)

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-69
Author(s):  
Thomas Burri ◽  
Jamie Trinidad
Keyword(s):  
Indian Ocean ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
International Tribunal ◽  
Maritime Boundary ◽  
The Indian Ocean ◽  
The Law ◽  
Arbitral Proceedings ◽  
Chagos Archipelago

On January 28, 2021, a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) delivered a judgment in which it rejected preliminary objections raised by the Maldives in arbitral proceedings instituted by Mauritius, concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary north of the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean.

Normative propositions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
Roman Kolodkin
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
International Tribunal ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Law ◽  
Obiter Dictum ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Advisory Opinions

Normative propositions of the international courts, including these of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, are considered in the paper as provisions in the judicial decisions and advisory opinions, spelling out, formulating or describing international law norms, prescriptions, prohibitions or authorizations, which are applicable, in the court’s view, in the case at hand and the similar cases. Such a proposition is considered to be a description of a legal norm, its spelling out by a court, but not a norm or its source. In contrast with legal norms, judicial normative propositions are descriptive, not prescriptive; they may be true or wrong. Normative propositions are not transformed into norms solely by their repetition in judicial decisions. The author considers not only ITLOS decisions but also the Tribunal’s and its Seabed disputes chamber advisory opinions containing normative propositions to be subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law under article 38(1(d)) of the International Court of Justice Statute. The legal reasoning of the Tribunal’s decision, not its operative provisions, usually features normative propositions. While strictly speaking, the decision addresses the parties of the dispute, normative propositions in the reasoning are in fact enacted by the Tribunal urbi et orbi aiming at all relevant actors, ITLOS including. They bear upon substantive and procedural issues, rights and obligations of relevant actors; they may also define legal notions. The Tribunal provides them as part of its reasoning or as obiter dictum. It is those provisions of the Tribunal’s decisions that are of particular importance for international law through detailing treaty- and verbalizing customary rules. However, the States that have the final and decisive say confirming or non-confirming the content and binding nature of the rules spelt out or described by the Tribunal in its normative propositions. Meanwhile, States are not in a hurry to publicly react to the judicial normative propositions, particularly to those of ITLOS, though they refer to them in pleadings or when commenting on the International Law Commission drafts. At times, States concerned argue that international judicial decisions are not binding for third parties. While the States are predominantly silent, ITLOS reiterates, develops and consolidates normative propositions, and they begin to be perceived as law. The paper also points to the possibility of the Tribunal’s normative propositions being not correct and to the role of the judges’ dissenting and separate opinions in identifying such propositions.

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