ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА СПЕЦИФІКА ТЛУМАЧЕННЯ І ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИМИ СУДАМИ ПОЛОЖЕНЬ ЄКПЛ ТА ПРАКТИКИ ЄСПЛ

У даній статті, автори досліджують роль Європейської конвенції з прав людини та практики Європейського суду з прав людини у функціонуванні національного судоустрою. У роботі розкриваються позитивні та негативні аспекти застосування норм Конвенції та практики Суду. Автори досліджують правову природу судових прецедентів, їх структуру (ratio decidendi та obiter dictum) та приклади застосування суддями приписів Конвенції та практики ЄСПЛ у власній правозастосовчій діяльності. Окрім цього, автори висвітлюють певні види правових «дефектів» у вітчизняній судовій діяльності у застосуванні практики ЄСПЛ та норм Конвенції («декларативне», «помилкове» та «маніпулятивне» застосування). Окремо підкреслюється проблема «релевантного» (належного) застосування приписів прецедентів ЄСПЛ. Наприкінці роботи, запропоновані певні способи щодо покращення механізму належного використання Конвенції та практики ЄСПЛ.

Normative propositions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Normative propositions of the international courts, including these of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, are considered in the paper as provisions in the judicial decisions and advisory opinions, spelling out, formulating or describing international law norms, prescriptions, prohibitions or authorizations, which are applicable, in the court’s view, in the case at hand and the similar cases. Such a proposition is considered to be a description of a legal norm, its spelling out by a court, but not a norm or its source. In contrast with legal norms, judicial normative propositions are descriptive, not prescriptive; they may be true or wrong. Normative propositions are not transformed into norms solely by their repetition in judicial decisions. The author considers not only ITLOS decisions but also the Tribunal’s and its Seabed disputes chamber advisory opinions containing normative propositions to be subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law under article 38(1(d)) of the International Court of Justice Statute. The legal reasoning of the Tribunal’s decision, not its operative provisions, usually features normative propositions. While strictly speaking, the decision addresses the parties of the dispute, normative propositions in the reasoning are in fact enacted by the Tribunal urbi et orbi aiming at all relevant actors, ITLOS including. They bear upon substantive and procedural issues, rights and obligations of relevant actors; they may also define legal notions. The Tribunal provides them as part of its reasoning or as obiter dictum. It is those provisions of the Tribunal’s decisions that are of particular importance for international law through detailing treaty- and verbalizing customary rules. However, the States that have the final and decisive say confirming or non-confirming the content and binding nature of the rules spelt out or described by the Tribunal in its normative propositions. Meanwhile, States are not in a hurry to publicly react to the judicial normative propositions, particularly to those of ITLOS, though they refer to them in pleadings or when commenting on the International Law Commission drafts. At times, States concerned argue that international judicial decisions are not binding for third parties. While the States are predominantly silent, ITLOS reiterates, develops and consolidates normative propositions, and they begin to be perceived as law. The paper also points to the possibility of the Tribunal’s normative propositions being not correct and to the role of the judges’ dissenting and separate opinions in identifying such propositions.

Die EU-Grundrechtsberechtigung öffentlicher Unternehmen – Anmerkung zu BVerfG, Beschluss v. 18.8.2020, 1 BvQ 82/80 (STEAG GmbH)

In seinem STEAG-Eilbeschluss vom 18. August 2020 hat das BVerfG seine ständige Rechtsprechung bestätigt, nach der sich ein mehrheitlich in öffentlicher Hand befindliches inländisches Unternehmen nach Art. 19 Abs. 3 GG in Anwendung der Lehre des personalen Substrats sowie des „Konfusionsarguments“ nicht auf deutsche Grundrechte, insbesondere nicht auf Art. 12 Abs. 1 und Art. 14 Abs. 1 GG, berufen kann. Gleichzeitig hat es in einem obiter dictum festgestellt, dass auch nach den Vorgaben der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (GRC), wäre sie anwendbar, nichts Abweichendes gelte. Entgegen dieser ersten vorläufigen Äußerung des BVerfG ist auf der unionsrechtlichen Ebene der GRC grundsätzlich von einer funktional-relativen Grundrechtsberechtigung auch staatlich beherrschter Einheiten auszugehen. Diese können sich danach insbesondere auch auf die Wirtschaftsgrundrechte berufen, soweit sie nicht spezifisch hoheitlich, sondern wirtschaftlich, d.h. als Unternehmen im Sinne des Unionsrechts tätig sind.

Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. Republic of Kazakhstan

424Jurisdiction — Foreign investor — ICSID Convention, Article 25(2)(b) — Foreign nationality — Ownership or control — Investment — Economic contribution — Whether the scope of protection under the BIT for companies under foreign control fell within the outer limit of ICSID jurisdiction — Whether the national of another contracting State had made an investment — Whether establishing foreign ownership under the BIT was sufficient in light of the requirement for foreign control in the ICSID ConventionJurisdiction — Investment — Interpretation — “Every kind of investment” — Economic contribution — Origin of capital — Whether the definition of investment required an economic contribution by a foreign national — Whether origin of capital was relevant to the existence of an investmentJurisdiction — Investment — Interpretation — ICSID Convention, Article 25(1) — Whether the inherent meaning of investment under ICSID jurisprudence was relevant in determining ownership or control by a foreign national — Whether there was an economic arrangement requiring a contribution to make a profit and some degree of riskJurisdiction — Investment — Foreign nationality — Ownership or control — Evidence — Burden of proof — Adverse inferences — Whether the burden of proof can shift from the claimant to the State due to seizure of document — Whether adverse inferences may be drawn from the failure to produce documentsAnnulment — Failure to state reasons — Manifest excess of powers — Serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure — ICSID Convention, Article 52(1) — Foreign nationality — Applicable law — Obiter dictum — Translation — Whether a tribunal’s misapplication of or failure to apply the applicable law justified annulment if its interpretation was reasonable or tenable — Whether reliance on an incorrect translation warranted annulment if the reasoning was incidental to the operative part of the award — Whether obiter dictum issued without hearing warranted annulment

LIBERDADE DE EXPRESSÃO EM PERÍODO ELEITORAL: RESTRIÇÕES SÃO ADMITIDAS PELA CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL?

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a liberdade de expressão no contexto do período eleitoral, tendo como referencial o julgamento da ADI 4451, que levou o tema à apreciação do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A pesquisa é documental e adota abordagem dedutiva, identificando as premissas fixadas no julgado do STF para indicar as orientações para as próximas eleições. Sem deixar de reconhecer a possibilidade de restrições necessárias à higidez do processo eleitoral, a exemplo da vedação da propaganda política, o julgado segue de forma coerente a jurisprudência da corte constitucional, reconhecendo que restrições à liberdade de expressão são excepcionais. Nesta linha, reconhece a desproporcionalidade das restrições impostas no art. 45, incisos II e III (segunda parte), da Lei das Eleições ( Lei 9.504/1997). Ainda que em sede de obiter dictum, o fenômeno das fakes news é tangenciado no julgamento, que reconhece a liberdade de imprensa como instrumento importante para o combate deste fenômeno pernicioso ao regime democrático. A abordagem é original na medida em que insere na análise do julgamento debates atuais sobre o tema das fakes News, ganhando destaque a importância do enfrentamento do tema diante da proximidade das eleições municipais.

The highest courts’ activities as a factor establishing precedent in the capacity of a source of Ukrainian law

The Ukrainian legislation does not apply the term «precedent». It is understandable for the legal system of the Romano-Germanic family. However, judicial precedents serve as de facto source of Ukrainian law. Activities of the highest judicial institutions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Court, providing guidelines on application of particular legal rules are principal contributors for this state of affairs. The paper provides an overview of such activities in order to evaluate the process and its prospects. Covering the ECtHR activities, it is noted that the key elements of precedent law, such as application of stare decisis doctrine, ratio decidendi and obiter dictum components in decisions, are available there. Ukrainian courts are obliged by the statutes to apply ECtHR judgements and decisions in their own cases. Hence, the judicial precedents created by the ECtHR are the source of Ukrainian law. This discussion is followed by an analysis of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine decisions. It is concluded that been interpretative precedents they serve as a source of law as well. The third institution under examination, the Supreme Court, is empowered, inter alia, to formulate in its rulings guidelines for the application of law in a variety of situations. Since such rules are binding on the courts and other authorities, they have inherent features of the precedents and should be considered as a source of law. The article summarizes that Ukraine falls within the continental Europe’s general trend. It implies the significant growth of the role of the European and national courts as a rule-making institutions resulting in reinforcement of the precedent as a source of law and its formalization in terms of the civil law jurisdictions. In general, such process allowing prompt adaptation to the contemporary realities is positive. To facilitate it, the term «precedent» have to be introduced into the practical area. In particular, the role of judicial precedent as a source of law should be reflected in the Ukrainian procedural legislation.

7. How Precedent Operates: Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum

The aim of this chapter is to emphasise that legal analysis is not just a question of comparing facts or using a set of balancing scales to see if the facts weigh about the same. The situation is often much more complicated than that. This chapter discusses the following: the development of case law and why cases may be distinguished as well as applied on the material facts; defining ratio decidendi; perception and ratio; ratio and interpretation; obiter dictum; how precedents develop; answering legal questions on precedent; material facts; what can happen to a case; the postal rule cases; and the ‘uncertainty principle’ of cases.