The Impact of Overconfidence and Ambiguity Attitude on Market Entry

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Gutierrez ◽  
Thomas B. Astebro ◽  
Tomasz Obloj



2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Gutierrez ◽  
Thomas B. Astebro ◽  
Tomasz Obloj


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Gutierrez ◽  
Thomas Åstebro ◽  
Tomasz Obloj


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Baumann ◽  
Tim Friehe

AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.





2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 805-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Kachour ◽  
Olivier Mamavi ◽  
Haithem Nagati

This article studies the impact of reputation on market entry in public procurement. Based on the observation of a French firm with a strong reputation, we demonstrate a significant effect of the difference in public contracts won between date t-1 and date t. Our model provides empirical proof that selection of a supplier with a strong reputation does not hinder entry in public procurement nor does it prevent free competition. This result thus questions the justification for the European Union regulation that limits the use of information on past performance to select suppliers in public markets. The findings also suggest that reputation mechanisms can help reduce uncertainty during contract execution. 





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