CEO Characteristics and Value of Cash Holdings

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seongjae Mun ◽  
Dongwook Seo ◽  
Seung Hun Han
Keyword(s):  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Value Of Cash ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

Product Market Predation Risk and the Value of Cash Holdings

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianxin Daniel Chi ◽  
Xunhua Su
Keyword(s):  
Predation Risk ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Value Of Cash

Audit Quality and the Market Value of Cash Holdings: The Case of Office-Level Auditor Industry Specialization

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Jay Junghun Lee ◽  
Jong Chool Park
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Market Value ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Value Of Cash ◽  
Office Level ◽  
Industry Specialist

SUMMARY This study investigates the monitoring role of high-quality auditors defined as office-level industry specialists in the stock market valuation of cash assets. We find that the market value of cash holdings is significantly higher for the client of an industry specialist auditor. The marginal value of cash is 34 cents higher for the client of a joint-industry specialist at both the national and city levels than for the client of a nonspecialist. We also find that cash holdings are more closely associated with capital investment and the market value of capital investment is significantly higher when the auditor is a joint-industry specialist. Moreover, we find that the value of cash increases significantly when the client changes its auditor to a joint-industry specialist. Our findings hold even after controlling for the client's governance efficacy and financial reporting quality. Our results provide new insight into the mechanism through which high-quality audits affect firm value: External audits facilitate shareholders' monitoring over managerial cash expenditures, thereby leading market participants to attach a higher value to cash holdings.

Share pledging, payout policy, and the value of cash holdings

2021 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 18-33
Author(s):  
Robin K. Chou ◽  
Yu-Chun Wang ◽  
J. Jimmy Yang
Keyword(s):  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Value Of Cash

What is a Dollar Worth? The Market Value of Cash Holdings

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Foster Pinkowitz ◽  
Rohan G. Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Value Of Cash

How does real earnings management affect the value of cash holdings? Comparisons between information and agency perspectives

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 47-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Che-Chia Chang ◽  
Li-Han Kao ◽  
Hsin-Yu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Value Of Cash

Does financial reporting regulation influence the value of cash holdings?

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 52-67
Author(s):  
Ahmet Karpuz ◽  
Kirak Kim ◽  
Neslihan Ozkan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Value Of Cash

Audit committee members with CEO experience and the value of cash holdings

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 897-926
Author(s):  
Sunhwa Choi ◽  
Jinwoong Han ◽  
Taejin Jung ◽  
Bomi Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Marginal Value ◽  
Value Of Cash ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Accounting Expertise

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine whether the presence of an audit committee (AC) members with Chief Executive Officer (CEO) experience (supervisory experts) affects the market value of cash holdings. Design/methodology/approach To estimate the marginal value of cash holdings, this study uses the model proposed by Faulkender and Wang (2006). The sample is 2,031 firm-year observations in Korea from 2000 through 2015. Findings The authors find that the presence of supervisory experts on ACs has a negative impact on the value of cash holdings. This result suggests that supervisory experts on ACs weaken monitoring of managerial actions. The authors also find that the negative effect of supervisory experts on the value of cash holdings is mitigated when there are other AC members with accounting expertise. Practical implications The findings that AC supervisory expertise impairs the effectiveness of ACs, and thus destroys shareholder value have policy implications because the current regulations in many countries use a broad definition of financial expertise that includes supervisory expertise. Originality/value This is the first study that directly examines the effect of AC supervisory expertise on the value of cash holdings. The study also contributes to the literature on the role of ACs in emerging markets by documenting the limitations of corporate governance systems adopted from the Anglo–Saxon model.

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