A Tripartite Game-Theory-Based Cooperation Mechanism for the Electronic Warehouse Receipt Pledge Financing Mode

To explore the electronic warehouse receipt pledge financing cooperation mechanism in the alliance formed between loan enterprises, commercial banks, e-commerce platforms, and logistics enterprises, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the game equilibrium strategy is then obtained, and the influencing factors of the cooperation mechanism are further simulated. It was found that in this tripartite evolutionary game, the stable strategy combination occurs when the loan enterprise chooses to repay on time, the platform alliance chooses to provide services, and the commercial bank chooses to continue to cooperate. However, heterogeneity exists in the influencing factors for the three-party selection strategy in the game, which is manifested in the fact that the higher the realization rate of the pledge, the more evolution is required in the selection strategy for loan enterprises to continue cooperating. The higher the information service fee, the higher the enthusiasm of the platform alliance in choosing to provide services. Credit levels, loan interest rates, and pledge realization rates are all important factors that affect the choice strategy of commercial banks.

A Novel Two-Stage Game Model for Pricing Cloud/Fog Computing Resource in Blockchain Systems

Cloud/fog computing resource pricing is a new paradigm in the blockchain mining scheme, as the participants would like to purchase the cloud/fog computing resource to speed up their mining processes. In this paper, we propose a novel two-stage game to study the optimal price-based cloud/fog computing resource management, in which the cloud/fog computing resource provider (CFP) is the leader, setting the resource price in Stage I, and the mining pools act as the followers to decide their demands of the resource in Stage II. Since mining pools are bounded rational in practice, we model the dynamic interactions among them by an evolutionary game in Stage II, in which each pool pursues its evolutionary stable demand based on the observed price, through continuous learning and adjustments. Backward induction method is applied to analyze the sub-game equilibrium in each stage. Specifically in Stage II, we first build a general study framework for the evolutionary game model, and then provide a detailed theoretical analysis for a two-pool case to characterize the conditions for the existence of different evolutionary stable solutions. Referring to the real world, we conduct a series of numerical experiments, whose results validate our theoretical findings for the case of two mining pools. Additionally, the impacts from the size of mining block, the unit transaction fee and the price of token on the decision makings of participants are also discussed.

Exploring Tourism Recovery in the Post-COVID-19 Period: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

This study aims to explore the process of tourism recovery in the post-COVID-19 period and the role of stakeholders in promoting such a process. Using evolutionary game theory, this study analyzes the behavior interactions and game equilibrium of stakeholders in the development of tourism by constructing an evolutionary game model amongst governments, tourists and tourism enterprises. Then, the influences of different evolution paths and major parameters affecting stakeholders’ strategy selection are discussed. With the aim of illustrating the role of the stakeholders in the tourism sector’s economic recovery under the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the numerical experiment was conducted using the MATLAB 2016 software. The results show that the development and change of the emergent public health events affect tourism stakeholders’ behavior strategy. Moreover, the strategic choices of each player, including governments, tourism enterprises and tourists, are also constantly evolving at different stages of the pandemic.

Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble

In China, the housing bubble is not only an economic issue but also an important social and political issue. According to game theory, the housing bubble is an equilibrium result of the interaction between policy environment and participants’ behavior. In this process, due to the interaction between speculation, regulation, and emotions, the development and evolution of the housing bubble are faced with uncertainty. Different from traditional econometric analysis, this article adopts the evolutionary game analysis method in order to establish a multi-stage evolutionary game analysis framework for the housing bubble. Firstly, by analyzing the emotional perceived value of related subjects under optimism, pessimism, and uncertainty, this article explores the mechanism of emotional perceived value on the housing bubble under the condition of inconsistent policy objectives. Secondly, it introduces emotional perceived value into the evolutionary game analysis framework of housing bubbles and analyzes the strategic combination and game equilibrium between investors and local governments under different emotions. Finally, taking Hainan province as an example, it conducts a MATLAB numerical simulation on the uncertain evolution of the housing bubble and proposes a staged strategy combination to deal with the housing bubble. The results show that: (1) emotional perceived value is affected by policy environment; (2) changes in the strength of policy effects make emotional perceived value change, which has different incentive effects on investors’ speculation and local governments’ regulation; (3) there are differences in emotional perceived value in different stages, which improves the uncertainty of the game equilibrium result between investors and local governments; and (4) considering the evolutionary characteristics of the housing bubble in different stages, its countermeasures should not only prevent insufficient regulation but also avoid excessive regulation. The above conclusions can provide theoretical and practical references for predicting the behavior of real estate investors, identifying the evolution mechanisms and rules of real estate bubbles and formulating relevant regulatory policies.

GAME EQUILIBRIUM BASED CONTROL ANALYSIS ON THE SUSTAINABLE MARKET STRUCTURE OF RARE METAL MINERAL RESOURCES – EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

In rare metal mineral market, as a complex system, multiple decision-making among the stakeholders increases the complexity in its market structure and dynamic process. The unreasonable compensation pricing mechanism for the development of the rare metal mineral resources in China requires to be studied. Drawing on the methods of game theory model and chaos control analysis, this paper builds theoretical model of rare metal mineral market structure, corporating related parameters of rare metal in the game theory model, to conduct the chaotic nature and path analysis, expecting to solve the bottleneck problems that restrict the rare metal pricing and resource security and enhance the waste valorization for the sustainability. Specificly, a Cournot-Nash Equilibrium model is built to analyze the Cournot-equilibrium point, the stability of the Cournot Equilibrium point, the chaotic status, as well as the pattern to chaos of the game system in the rare metal mineral resource market, numerical simulation is used to verify the model. The conclusions facilitate the formulation of industrial economic policies and further improvement of managerial strategies to solve market problems.

Multidimensional Fairness Equilibrium Evaluation of Urban Housing Expropriation Compensation Based on VIKOR

Against the backdrop of emerging markets and the transitional society, the large-scale start-up of real estate development projects has brought about rapid economic growth and accelerated urban expansion, followed by extreme disputes between social groups. This paper aims to effectively solve the real dilemma of urban housing expropriation by obtaining a consensus regarding the fairness of compensation standards among expropriation compensation-related subjects. Three behavioral preferences—profit-seeking fairness, loss aversion and interactive fairness—were added to a multidimensional fairness equilibrium evaluation indicator system of urban housing expropriation compensation. The entropy method was used to calculate their weights. A multidimensional fairness game model and a multidimensional fairness equilibrium evaluation method based on compromise multi-criteria decision-making VlseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) of urban housing expropriation compensation were constructed to combine different strategic schemes of related subjects for the purpose of obtaining the compromise optimal solution, that is, the multidimensional fairness game equilibrium solution. The stability of the multidimensional fairness game model and the objectivity of the multidimensional fairness equilibrium evaluation were tested and verified through case data analysis and sensitivity analysis. The conclusion is drawn that the multidimensional fairness game equilibrium solution can effectively resolve extreme disputes regarding urban housing expropriation.

Analysis of Customization Strategy for E-Commerce Operation Based on Big Data

In order to improve the efficiency of customization and reduce the cost of customization under Big data environment, this paper uses cost-sharing contract, pricing mechanism, Hotelling model, and game theory tools and research methods, for C2B Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) mode of Supply Chain Pricing Strategy for in-depth discussion. This paper first gives the architecture of the customization service system based on big data. The paper studies the game equilibrium of supply chain members under four scenarios: centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, C2B-dominated decision-making, and traditional enterprise-dominated decision-making in a supply chain composed of a supplier and C2B e-commerce enterprises with horizontal price competition, and examines the cross-price. Important parameters such as impact coefficient, impact coefficient of effort degree of personalized customization, and so on have an impact on variables such as effort degree of personalized customization, retail price, and profit of supply chain members of C2B e-commerce enterprises. Research shows that with the increase of cross-price impact coefficient, C2B e-commerce will enhance its personalized customization efforts in different situations in order to pursue higher profits.

Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

Corporate Data Sharing, Leakage, and Supervision Mechanism Research

Data sharing helps to make full use of each other’s data and enable the digital economy. With the gradual rise of corporate data sharing, the frequent occurrence of data leakage events highlights the dilemma of data sharing, leakage and supervision, which infringes on the data assets of the leaked party. Our paper aims to design an effective data supervision mechanism and achieve the stability of data sharing alliance. Therefore, this paper considers the data technology capabilities of both parties of the data sharing alliance and the benefits and loss of data leakage, establishes the game model and supervision mechanism of data sharing, leakage and supervision under the condition of complete information, and analyzes the game equilibrium and the influence of different supervision levels on the company’s data sharing and leakage behavior. The results show that the company sharing and leaking behavior is affected by both the level of data supervision fines and the relative technical level. Our model can make up for the weakness of the low-tech company, control the company’s choice of leaking behaviors, and ensure the stability of data sharing alliance by designing reasonable data supervision mechanism, especially the severe data supervision strategy.