An Empirical Analysis of the Performance of Hedge Funds Over the Period 1998 to 2003 in Terms of Incentive Fees, Management Fees, Size, Age, Hurdle Rate, High Watermark Provision and Lockup Period

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Guirguis

2021 ◽  
pp. 252-282
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Jan Schnitzler

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.



2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Steri ◽  
Marco Giorgino ◽  
Diego Viviani


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (8) ◽  
pp. 756-768
Author(s):  
Ewelina Sokołowska






2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 176-190
Author(s):  
Greg N Gregoriou ◽  
Razvan Pascalau


2012 ◽  
pp. 419-436
Author(s):  
Greg N. Gregoriou ◽  
Razvan Pascalau




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