Gone Global: The International Diffusion of Hedge Fund Activism

After decades of being primarily a US-based phenomenon, the globalization of hedge fund (HF) activism is increasing at an unprecedented speed. This chapter reviews the empirical research on HF activism by systematically comparing studies conducted in the US and outside the US context. The nascent body of work on HF activism is categorized and discussed within four research sub-streams: the antecedents of HF activism; HF activists’ tactics; the responses of target firms to HF activist campaigns, and the outcomes of the latter for HF activists, target firms, and other stakeholders. Six select cases of interventions by a prominent HF activist illustrate the cross-country differences in hedge fund activist practices outlined in the literature review. The chapter concludes by outlining current research gaps and formulating research questions that could advance our knowledge on hedge fund activism in a global context.

Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.

The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds

The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds provides a comprehensive look at the hedge fund industry from a global perspective. The chapters are organized into five main parts. After the introductory chapter in Part I, Part II begins in Chapter 2 with an analysis of the main factors that have affected the operation of hedge funds. Chapter 3 explains the concept of hedge fund flows. Chapter 4 examines hedge fund manager fees and contracts. Part III focuses on different types of hedge fund strategies. The broad array of strategies are summarized in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 empirically examines the performance of hedge fund strategies. Chapter 7 compares the strategies of hedge funds to private equity funds. Chapter 8 examines hedge fund herding. Chapter 9 examines hedge fund commodity trading advisors and leverage. Chapter 10 examines financial technology in hedge fund strategies. In Part IV, hedge fund activism in the US is examined in Chapter 11. The US and international literature on hedge fund activism is reviewed in different perspectives in Chapters 12 and 13. Case studies are provided in Chapter 14. The impact of activism on large company innovation is discussed in Chapter 15. In Part V, Chapter 16 examines whether hedge funds may engage in misreporting and fraud. Chapter 17 reviews work on hedge fund misconduct and detection. Chapter 18 discusses compliance among hedge funds. Chapter 19 examines theoretical approaches to hedge fund regulation. Chapter 20 examines optimal taxation. Chapter 21 examines hedge funds from a political economy context.

Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation

While the jury is out on whether hedge fund activism encourages corporate innovation, there is mounting evidence to suggest that this is the case. A firm’s ability to innovate is crucial for its long-term survival. Through multiple mechanisms, activist hedge fund interventions can “shake things up” and stir corporations out of their myopic innovation investments. By bringing an end to the squandering of precious R&D resources, hedge fund activism stimulates and reshapes corporate competitiveness and enhances innovation performance. This chapter explores the strategies and mechanisms that activist hedge funds employ to influence corporate innovation and also offers avenues for future research.

A Review of Hedge Fund Activism: Impact on Shareholders vs. Stakeholders

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds, summarizing the sources and nature of the activist data and examining the evidence on target firm outcomes. Target firms do not exist in a vacuum, however; they have industry competitors, suppliers, customers, debtholders, and employees. Hedge fund activists often demand a reformulation of the target firm’s product market strategy to enhance its ability to earn inframarginal profits. This positive strategic effect may be especially significant for target firms that are economically distressed and facing predatory moves from deep-pocketed rival firms to induce exit. The putative significant effects of hedge fund activism on targets should generate spillover effects on their stakeholders. The chapter considers these spillover effects in a number of well-defined categories: industry rivals, customers, suppliers, debtholders, and employees.

Hedge Fund Activism and Financial Performance

The magnitude of changes in observable quantities of interest at hedge fund activism targets are economically small and unimportant except when the company is up for sale. When it can facilitate the sale of companies, hedge fund activism is likely to benefit target shareholders, though investors must consider whether the companies acquiring the targets are also in their portfolios and merely overpaying, so that money is simply shifting from one part of their portfolio to another. But the rest of hedge fund activism finds itself sitting with past rounds of shareholder activism of which it is only the latest manifestation. Like those past forms of shareholder activism, it just doesn’t seem to matter much.