Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.

A new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters

We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.

Corporate Social Responsibility Proposals and Firm Valuation

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a topic which has recently been attracting an increasing amount of attention with respect to corporate operations, and shareholder proposals on CSR are also one of the main types of proposals at firms’ annual shareholder meetings. However, even though the frequency of CSR proposals at annual meetings is comparable to other types of shareholder proposals, the approval rate of CSR proposals is significantly lower than that of other types of proposals, meaning that most CSR proposals are not recommended by the annual meeting to the board of directors for further approval. Motivated by this stylized fact, this study investigates the value of the submission of CSR shareholder proposals. Using a regression discontinuity design with shareholder proposal data of US public companies between 2006 and 2019, this study examines the importance of shareholders’ interest in CSR for firm valuation. Interestingly, while the CSR proposals themselves are typically not approved, the submission of CSR proposals by shareholders at annual meetings matters for the value impact of other types of shareholder proposals. More specifically, the causal effect of approving a corporate governance proposal on shareholder value is significantly positive only if the corporate governance proposal is voted together with a CSR proposal at the same meeting, i.e., the presence of CSR proposals is important for firm value through its interrelations with corporate governance proposals. This shows that the submission of CSR shareholder proposals has significant value implications, even if the CSR proposals themselves are not approved at annual meetings.

Calling out the laggards: shareholder activism and board gender diversity

Purpose While the presence of women in the boardroom has been steadily increasing, shareholders have taken action to push firms which lag in this area to add women to their boards. The purpose of this study is to examine whether firms with more gender homogenous (i.e. male-dominated) boards are disproportionately targeted with shareholder proposals calling for increased board gender diversity, how gender diversity among other firm leadership moderates this relationship, and whether firms respond. Design/methodology/approach Firth logistic regression is used to analyze the rare occurrence of a shareholder proposal within a sample of 7,226 firm year observations from S&P 1,500 firms in the USA between 2010 and 2017. Ordinary least squares regression is used to examine the subsequent three-year change in board gender diversity using a sample of 3,917 firm year observations. Findings The empirical findings indicate that firms with gender homogenous boards are more likely to incur shareholder proposals aimed at increasing board gender diversity. Having women in leadership positions (e.g. as the Chief Executive Officer) weakens this relationship. Finally, despite most proposals failing to pass, board gender diversity dramatically increases following the rendering of a proposal. Originality/value This study adds to the understanding of the principal-agent relationship, offering novel insights into shareholder responses to the lack of gender diversity among the board and firm responses to such activism. Furthermore, the authors add to the understanding of expectation violations with regard to gender diversity within firm boards. Finally, the authors find that women in other leadership positions insulate the firm from such shareholder activism – an important boundary condition of the findings.